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Abstract 
 
The importance of legitimacy, in both academic and business contexts, has been growing gradually, 
as stakeholders focus less on just the goods and services they purchase; legitimacy becomes 
standalone selling factor to many individuals, which numerous organizations including multi-
national corporation cannot ignore.  
 
This thesis paper aims to comprehend the complex process of legitimacy defense involving multi-
stakeholders, with contributions to the existing organization studies on legitimacy by researching 
how the media challenges and delegitimizes defensive corporate accounts deployed to control public 
sentiment. The primary objective of this thesis paper is to identify the delegitimization strategies 
employed by the Korean media to challenge Korean Air’s countermeasures after the nut-rage 
incident that occurred on 5th December 2014.  
 
Based on previous research conducted, notably that of van Leeuwen and Wodak (1999) and Vaara 
et al. (2006), categorization and analysis of Korean media articles, and corporate defensive accounts 
was conducted. Then critical discourse analysis (CDA) was adopted a key analysis tool, for 
developing an understanding of the delegitimization process. Using these two strategies, the 
strategic media texts and the subsequent corporate defensive accounts were categorized into four 
sensemaking strategies: authorization, rationalization, moral evaluation and normalization 
(mythopoesis was exempted).   
 
An insight into the process of delegitimization is shown by the findings of this paper, indicating that 
normative legitimacy challenges were most prevalent, with a small proportion of pragmatic 
challenges however no cognitive legitimacy challenges were identified. The causes behind the 
distribution of these legitimacy challenges is then discussed in-depth. Why Korean Air’s 
countermeasures yielded outcomes which were far beyond what would have originally been expected 
is also discussed. 
 
Although the contextual background of this paper is rather unique, it is still able to provide practical 
outcomes for future research and organizational process. It sheds light on the unique forms of 
multinational corporations (MNCs) within Korea: Chaebol, and how their existence affects corporate 
culture and associated legitimacy challenges. The importance of the media is also highlighted, as 
their contribution in conducting legitimacy challenges is significant. 
 
Keywords  : (Organizational) Delegitimization, Chaebol, Korea, media, communication, critical 
discourse analysis (CDA), corporate culture 
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1 Introduction 
Similarly addressed in Lars Thøger Christensen and Joep Cornelissen (2011)’s paper, there is 
a “continuous and growing” interest in the study of corporate communication by scholars of 
different academic background: management and organization theory, public relations, and so 
on. As one of the branches of corporate communication, a study of legitimacy and corporate 
culture are given a notable share of such interest as well. Despite being an “age-old issue”, 
the study of legitimacy still remains remarkable, playing central role in “influential social 
theories” and “institutional organizational analysis” (Thøger Christensen & Cornelissen, 
2011). Van Der Aart (2015) has claimed, “The theory of legitimacy states that individuals 
and organizations are more willing to share their resources with an organization that has a 
high legitimacy” (pg.3). Along with recent years’ growing interest of the legitimacy as 
scholarly topic, his words imply that legitimacy indeed is believed to be an important aspect 
for various organizations (by that corporates are of no exception) and their social interactions. 
Its academic and business importance would be more viable for further scholarly 
investigation when combined with the study of corporate culture – it may act as a key that 
explains how corporate culture is formed and altered as a need for change arises.  
As the focus of this paper will be about Korean media’s challenge toward legitimation 
strategies of Korean Air, which is one of “Chaebols” within Korea, it would indeed be a 
necessary to review the concept of Chaebol. Originated from a Japanese term: Zaibatsu 
[財閥(ざいばつ)]1, Chaebol (재벌/財閥) is now better represented as a Korean term to 
describe conglomerates specific to those that are created and currently operate within Korea. 
Chaebol has very significant influence in Korea over number of matters (Cho et al, 2014):  
1. initial and continuative economic growth and development within Korea; 
2. formation of Korean corporate culture; 
3. “growing public and political backlash against what are seen as overly powerful 
institutions” (p.1) 
The second and the third points deserves attention to be studied on, especially as a key to 
understand recent legitimacy challenge occurring in the Korean economy. With ideas adopted 
                                               
1 Ironically, Zaibatsu technically no longer exist, for a historical reason: disbanded by GHQ post WW2. 
However it turned later into ‘Keiretsu,’ which is elaborated later on. 
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from Shin (1992), Schein (2004), Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov (2010), Cho et al. (2014) 
has defined corporate culture as “psychological sub-system that employees share”; this 
includes “beliefs, values or behavioral norms within an organization” (p.2). Chaebols’ strong 
economic performance has eventually contributed significant amount in formation of Korean 
corporate culture: “unique and strong corporate culture” (p.2). Such corporate culture is 
deemed to be a product of a unique combination of two important concepts: collectivism2 
and progressivism3, which formed ‘dynamic collectivism’ (Cho & Yoon, 2001). The 
reckoned-to-be-positive aftermaths of formation of such corporate culture include (Cho et al., 
2014).: 
1. emphasis on strong cohesiveness among employees. 
2. “pursue fast alteration in response to changes of environment and prepare for the 
future with optimism, thus producing the common ‘hurry up, hurry up’ or ‘can-do’ 
spirit” (Cho et al., 2014). 
Cho and Yoon (2001) further elaborates on unique features of Korean corporate culture that it 
fosters fierce competition, eventually spreading it to society in general as well. Even though 
this unique corporate culture initially started off from a concept of traditional collectivism, its 
idea stayed only within its internal members; it created and reinforced boundary against those 
who are not admitted as part of the group (Chaebol).  
Interestingly however, Korean corporate culture that Chaebols have formed so far – the one 
that Cho et al. (2014) have argued it to be “deeply ingrained and slow moving” – is 
progressively facing legitimacy challenge; what was accepted back then is now being 
questioned, denied and challenged. Along with time change and enormous economic growth 
and development, change in generation led to occurrence of notable social shifts; corporate 
culture also face consequential need to cope with this change (Cho et al., 2014). Contrary to 
what corporate culture within Korea was originally aimed, many individuals nowadays view 
the corporate culture of Korean society in general to be very oppressive, especially under 
                                               
2 Collectivism defined as a political theory that the people should own the means of production; he idea that 
people should prioritize the good of society over the welfare of the individual (collectivism, n.d.) 
3 Progressivism has been defined as “the propensity to: pursue fast alteration in response to changes of 
environment and prepare for the future with optimism, thus producing the common ‘hurry up, hurry up’ or ‘can-
do’ spirit” (Cho et al., 2014). 
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Chaebols4. Desiring a greater economic democracy and organizational justice, the younger 
generation of Korean society has found current corporate culture frustrating, naming it as 
“abusing culture5 [Hangul6:갑질7 문화 / Revised Romanization of Korean (hereafter RR): 
‘Gap-zil Munhua’].” Although it is on the premise that definition of economic democracy 
needs to be more clearly defined, Kristel Van der Elst and Sushant Palakurthi Rao8, in their 
2013 article, have emphasized such phenomena, stating: 
“(To have any impact on Korea’s rising income inequality and slowing growth rates) the 
public has called for action and politicians have responded with pledges for “economic 
democracy9” – a catch-all slogan for reform.” 
While the “background ‘stereotypic’ characteristics of corporate culture at Chaebol group 
level still have a strong influence” on individuals (Cho et al., 2014; p.8) – that is, unique and 
distinguishable cultural characteristics of each Chaebol formed from the founder still remain, 
alluding that convergence (of corporate culture) suggested by Rowley (2013) does not seem 
to prevail – this has resulted in emergence of new aspect (perhaps a different direction) of 
employee’s value orientation; videlicet, greater degree of individualism and decline in 
positive-oriented mind, which has been an important aspect of dynamic collectivism of 
Chaebol corporate culture. 
Observing many ridiculous cases of illegitimate corporate behaviors and communication 
failures against its stakeholders: mainly, workforce, it was not too long that I as well started 
to fear and expect working in my home country may not be as pleasant as I have previously 
thought of. As the circumstances of Korean companies seem to somewhat appear contrary to 
what Van Der Aart has claimed, however, a key question remains to be answered: do 
                                               
4 Topic of Chaebols will also be further elaborated in literature review section 
5 Not the direct translation, but closest I can get considering its Hangul (Korean character) context. 
6 Hangul is a Korean term describing Korean as a written language. 
7 This is regarded as a slang; this is a combination of a word “갑(甲) – the one in superior position” and “질 – 
(slang term for) an act of performing (whatever word added in front)”. 
8 Director and Head of Strategic Foresight at the World Economic Forum and Senior Director and Head of Asia 
at the World Economic Forum 
9 “In general terms, economic democracy seems to mean a restructuring from export-led to domestic, demand-
driven growth with greater opportunities for small and medium businesses to flourish” (Van der Elst and Rao, 
2013). 
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companies, particularly Chaebols within Korea, invests perfunctory amount of effort and 
resources to obtain legitimacy when especially challenge toward the owner family members 
is involved, whether their images matter significantly to their business or not? The main 
focus of this paper, what so called the Korean Air case, is one prime example of such case. 
For those who may not be familiar with this corporate, Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd. (Hangul: 
대한항공; RR: Daehan Hanggong) is the biggest airline in South Korea, in terms of fleet 
size, international destinations and international flights. The case for this paper, known 
widely known as “the nut-rage case1011,” is a Korean Air’s failure on legitimacy defense and 
crisis management, specifically in its attempt to communicate and convince its desired 
legitimation to its various stakeholders after normally unacceptable behavior by ex-vice 
president Cho Hyun-ah (Heather Cho). 
1.1 Research goals and objectives 
The overall goal of this paper is to view organizational legitimacy in relation to corporate 
culture - how they in particular can interact or threaten each other. Specifically, the central 
aim is to investigate how the actions of an organization are discursively legitimatized/de-
legitimatized in the media. The role of media was notable in this particular case; without 
media’s fierce pursuit of the case and questioning of legitimacy, the case could have been 
silently buried. 
The main central research question, therefore, is:  
What delegitimization strategies were used in the media to question Korean Air’s 
countermeasures in the nut-rage incident?  
1.2 Structure of the thesis 
Structure wise, this paper consists of 6 sections. The first section of the paper: introduction 
provides motivation of the author to write this paper, essential contexts and research question. 
Theoretical framework, as the second section, narrates associated literatures for this paper. 
The literature review discusses the notion of legitimacy, and its sub-categories that will be 
                                               
10 The case’s full name is often referred as “an incident of Korean Air Flight number KE 086 take-off delay 
(대한항공 KE 086 편 이륙지연 사건).” 
11 Some Korean media prefer calling it ‘the nut-return’ (땅콩회황) incident; in this paper, the nut-rage will be 
used instead however, as it is more familiar term internationally. 
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considered in this paper. It also addresses the notion of ‘Chaebol,’ which is another central 
element of this paper. Then, data and methodology are introduced. This section starts off by 
offering short summary of the ‘nut-rage’ incident, which is the starting point of the 
delegitimization warfare. Then, the Korean Air’s countermeasures: official and ulterior 
actions regarding the case are mentioned. In the second subsection of methodology, data to be 
collected is mentioned: the strategic media text as the main data, and defensive corporate 
accounts as complementary data. The section is then concluded by elaborating on critical 
discourse analysis on legitimacy to be used for the paper, which categorizes into five models. 
Based on these, the section four contains findings of the research. Information presented in 
the findings are further developed in the discussion section. Last, the contribution and 
conclusion of the study is presented. After academic and pragmatic implications are 
discussed, limitation of the study and suggestion for the future research are given as well.  
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2 Theoretical framework 
2.1 (Organizational) Legitimacy 
Prior to other notable literatures that cover legitimacy in various areas, I would like to start 
with works from J.B. Dowling and J. Pfeffer12 and by Mark C. Suchman13. Based on their 
foundational research works claiming (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975):  
1. organizational legitimacy reflects a congruence between social system norms 
2. social values are associated with or implied by an organization’s activities  
it can be stated that legitimacy acts as necessary asset that assists an organization to sustain 
the flow of resources from its operating environment, citing Hannan & Freeman (1989) that 
Suchman cited. Scott et al (2000) further elaborate on such claim, insisting that organizations 
require more than mere material resources and technical information, in order to “survive and 
thrive in their social environments” (Patel et al, 2005). Taking the these in mind, 
organizational legitimacy could be identified as “a generalized perception or assumption that 
the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed 
system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions” (Suchman, 1995, p. 574). Meyer and Scott 
offer a different approach to the definition of the term, claiming that ‘organizational 
legitimacy refers to the degree of cultural support for an organization - the extent to which the 
array of established cultural accounts provide explanations for its existence, functioning, and 
jurisdiction …' (Meyer and Scott, 1983: 201). 
An organization’s actions, goals and many other components are judged by its environmental 
actors / stakeholders, letting them to confer or withdraw legitimacy to/from an organization. 
Culture, norms, rules and laws are notable set of accepted standards that Scott et al (2000) 
suggests. Along with these standards, Dowling and Pfeffer (1975) viewed that the legitimacy 
within an organization can be formed in three ways. First is via conforming to existing social 
norms; second involves altering social norms and third deals “becom[ing] identified with 
symbols, values, or institutions which have a strong base of social legitimacy” (Dowling & 
Pfeffer, 1975. p.127). They have added a note, suggesting that communication is a tool that 
directs the latter two strategies. It should also be noted, however, that the changing of social 
                                               
12 Organizational legitimacy: Social values and organizational behavior 
13 Managing legitimacy: strategic and institutional approaches 
7 
 
norms and values is very challenging, as they are the motivating factors of organizational 
change and source of pressure for organizational legitimation; that is to say, many 
organizations tend to choose the first or the third option (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975, p. 125). 
It is interesting to think that social action, as stated by political economist Max Weber in 
1968, is guided by legitimate order. In line with this argument, business organization, whether 
public or private, is required to be concerned about social expectations of its participating 
area, in order to achieve its aims. Parsons (1960) supports such idea as well, arguing that 
organizations that pursue goals in line with social values have a legitimate claim on resources 
It seems, through various cases of organizations worldwide, an understanding of 
organizational legitimacy is a key to elaborate on how they (should) adjust to the changing 
environment and potential crises. Suchman (1995) has emphasized legitimacy is a key 
element that enhances an organization’s stability, while D'Aunno and Zuckerman (1987) 
suggests it ensures organizational survivability, and Barnett (1997) mentions it as a mean of 
securing organizational viability. By doing so, legitimate organizations are accepted, valued 
and taken for granted as right, fitting and good (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994; Meyer and Scott, 
1983). Maintaining legitimacy thus is often routinized into organizational activity, according 
to Ashforth and Gibbs (1990). 
Addressed in Patel et al. (2005)’s paper, “a third wave of interest in legitimacy was based on 
cognitive belief systems” (p.4). That is, cognitive belief of stakeholders is another interesting 
reason why an importance of organizational legitimacy rises. Stakeholders relevant to an 
organization examine and judge it based on its adherence to social norms – this could be both 
local and global. This may contain but not limited to cultural models, appropriate structural or 
procedural regulations, and so on (Lounsubury & Glynn, 2001; Ruef & Scott, 1998). 
Before moving onto explaining types of legitimacy, an interesting literature review was done 
by Niina Erkama and Eero Vaara, and it has notable relevance to this paper. In their literature 
review, they have noted that several scholars of communication areas – Ashforth and Gibbs, 
Arndt and Bigelow and so on – found how impression management is a central part of 
legitimation. A key to the impression management highlights a role of discourse, as it is 
deemed crucial to legitimization of institution and institutional change (Phillips et al., 2004). 
Citing Elsbach, Sutton, Brown and Jones, Erkama and Vaara, according to such perspective it 
is claimed that “the management of legitimacy often involves targeted and even manipulative 
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rhetoric aimed at presenting issues in a way that promotes the interests and protects the power 
position of specific actors.” They have further added a note that “one essential finding of this 
research is that a successful framing requires that the audience can link the message to other 
discourses and identify with the key concepts and arguments” (Erkama and Vaara, 2010). 
Discourse, based on Fairclough (2003)’s point, can be illustrated as “linguistically mediated 
representation of the world” (Vaara & Tienari, 2008), playing a crucial role in MNCs. While 
knowledge of legitimacy in the field of management and organization seems fairly adequate, 
as Suchman (1995) would say, many scholars like Philips et al (2004) and Suddaby & 
Greenwood (2005) may argue that discursive aspects of legitimation have remained rather 
underexplored. In particular, MNC research has been facing this issue, as scholars in the field 
have given relatively less attention to the topic of discursive legitimation processes and 
practices (Geppert, 2003; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). 
As specifically addressed in van Dijk’s 1997 paper, adopting discursive approach for social 
research – organization and management studies as well –has been gradually increasing 
(Boje, Oswick, & Ford, 2004; Grant, Hardy, Oswick, & Putnam, 2004; Parker, 1992). To 
develop this research area further, Fairclough (2003) particularly argues that discourses 
should ideally be analyzed simultaneously at three levels:  
- text (micro-level textual elements) 
- discursive practice (the production and interpretation of texts) 
- social practice (the situational and institutional context) 
From a discursive perspective, it is necessary to take the notion that senses of legitimacy are 
created in relation to specific discourses. Videlicet, think of discourses as the “frames” 
provider that offers an understanding of particular issues to people (Fairclough, 1989, 1992; 
Fiss & Hirsch, 2005). For the involved stakeholders, these “frames” have significant 
relevance; for an instance, existence of particular available discourses may determine or 
influence how certain individuals make of and give sense to particular actions. This also 
indicates, however, that actors can intentionally position themselves in a better position by 
positioning themselves “vis-a-vis specific discourses” (Vaara & Tienari, 2008; p.4) or 
mobilizing particular discourses (Hardy et al., 2000; Rojo & van Dijk, 1997). 
2.2 Types of legitimacy 
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Legitimacy in specific can be elaborated into three types according to Suchman (1995) and 
Scott et al (2000): normative (moral)14, pragmatic, and cognitive legitimacy15. Each of these 
categories employ a different standard to evaluate legitimacy of an organization; moral 
legitimacy reflecting a positive normative evaluation of an organization and its activities 
could be one possible example of this case (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994).  
This specification of legitimacy models allows us to view how an organization and its 
environment(s) interact; whether an organization is legitimate or not is driven from “using all 
or a combination of these elements” (Patel et al, 2005; Ruef and Scott, 1998). While it would 
be favorable to achieve greater degree/number of legitimacy, it is quite challenging for an 
organization to attempting to meet its deemed-success level target of all three types of 
legitimacy (Suchman, 1995), some possibly due to conflicting interest of each legitimacy 
depending on nature of its operation, and so on.  
 
To start with, an organization gains normative (or moral) legitimacy, when it conducts and 
reflects socially acceptable/desirable norms, standards and values. Simplistically speaking, 
moral legitimacy depends on societal perspective judging an organization’s action to be 
morally acceptable. That is, moral legitimacy is threatened if the constituency of an 
organization perceives the organization’s actions are breaching political or perhaps economic 
agreements or system, especially for immoral reasons (Yankelovich, 1974). 
A notable aspect of this legitimacy is that constituencies of an organization assess it in terms 
of its social correctness and desirability, not whether the constituencies themselves derive 
benefits from it (Patel et al, 2005). To further elaborate this model of legitimacy, Suchman 
(1995: 579-582) identifies four variants of normative legitimacy in the literature:  
1) Judgements about outputs and consequences (consequential legitimacy);  
2) Evaluations of procedures and techniques (procedural legitimacy);  
3) Assessments of categories and structures (structural legitimacy);  
4) Evaluations of leaders and personnel (personal legitimacy). 
                                               
14 Different authors seem to use normative and moral legitimacy interchangeably. 
15 Scott et al however focused this more on institutional aspect, considering nature of his work 
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The first component of normative legitimacy focuses on judging an organization against 
criteria and output measures specific to the type of organization. That is to say that 
consequential legitimacy relates to what an organization has accomplished based on criteria 
that is specific to that organization (Suchman, 1995; Heidhues et al, 2012; Brinkerhoff, 
2005). Example of measuring consequential legitimacy can be, for an instance, patient 
mortality rates for hospitals, grade point average (GPA) or student graduation rates for 
schools, and more on. This suggests that organizations with tangible and measurable outputs 
may find this legitimacy relatively easier to achieve, whereas those with outputs that are 
subject to an argument or difficult to quantify may face contest (Brinkerhoff, 2005).  
Brinkerhoff (2005) has mentioned that while the first part of the normative legitimacy as 
“doing the right things,” procedural legitimacy can be interpreted as “doing things right” 
(p.8). It is indeed important for an organization to achieve economically and socially desired 
and valued results but it is not the only method of gaining normative legitimacy. Hence as the 
name ‘procedural’ legitimacy suggests, conducting “societally valued, validated and/or 
mandated practices and procedures” to garner legitimacy is equally significant (Brinkerhoff, 
2005).  Health, education, and social welfare sectors are the notable cases in a point, in 
which procedural legitimacy is formalized in regulatory oversight accreditation, and 
licensure. 
Structural legitimacy is fairly straight forward as well; it is granted to an organization when 
its constituencies view its structural characteristics are fair and legit to perform its tasks. 
Brinkerhoff offers an example of social service organization to explain the concept of 
structural legitimacy. Social service organizations are mostly non-profit, voluntary 
organization. This point validates them to belong in a “category of organizations recognized 
for pursuit of socially beneficial objectives, rather than for any specific results it has 
achieved” (p.8).  
Last but not least, personal legitimacy is derived from organizational leaders and staff 
personnel’s reputation, personal status and charisma (Suchman, 1995; Heidhues et al, 2012; 
Brinkerhoff, 2005). To wit, an organization garners personal legitimacy not due to its 
accomplishment or aims, but via how its constituencies view the legitimacy of organization’s 
titular head or representative. 
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While consequential legitimacy from normative legitimacy is concerned with how and what 
an organization has accomplished based on criteria that is specific to that organization, 
pragmatic legitimacy may take similar but different approach; it relates to the instrumental 
value of the organization for its stakeholders, in terms of how it fulfils their self-interest. The 
organization’s constituency therefore scrutinizes actions and behaviors taken by the 
organization, in order to determine their effects on self-interest of the constituency. 
Like how it is done in normative legitimacy, pragmatic legitimacy is further broken down 
into three sub-sections: 
1) Exchange legitimacy; 
2) Influence legitimacy; 
3) Dispositional legitimacy. 
First of all, Suchman (1995) defines exchange legitimacy as constituents / stakeholders’ 
support for organizational policies as they benefit from those. Borrowing a phrase from Van 
der Aart (2015), it is “legitimacy in exchange for what you get from that organization” (p.9). 
Not all constituency are concerned about direct benefit that they will receive from an 
organization that they support, however. Some may show their support because they believe 
the organization they support is capable and is responsible to handle their larger interests; in 
such case, they accord influence legitimacy to the organization (Suchman, 1995). Support for 
environmental NGO could be one supporting case of this type of legitimacy. Their work may 
not directly fulfill self-interest of their constituents, but the constituents still offer their 
support to see their greater interest to be achieved: change in regulatory outcome, such as 
legislation of pro-environmental policies, and so on (Brinkerhoff, 2005).   
Influence legitimacy can be, as suggested by Blinkerhoff (2005), quite important for an 
organization with intangible or hard-to-measure outputs, as it often faces a need to assure its 
constituents and stakeholders in some way as well. In their effort to build influence 
legitimacy, some employ and incorporate some form of stakeholder participation, to assure 
the stakeholders to witness organizational effort to demonstrate its effort and responsiveness 
to the stakeholder/constituents’ demand and feedback. 
The third type of pragmatic legitimacy is dispositional legitimacy. When stakeholders / 
constituents of an organization support it due to the good attributes that they believe the 
organization obtain. Although organizations are not human and thus do not have 
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personalities, individuals tend to personify organizations, characterizing them as being 
autonomous and attributing human characteristics, such as trustworthy, decent, or wise 
(Heidhues et al., 2012; Van der Aart, 2015). 
 
Cognitive legitimacy is created when an organization pursues goals that society deems to be 
proper and desirable. It differs from the above two legitimacies however, as it is not attributed 
based of the evaluation of organization and/or organizational action; videlicet, cognitive 
legitimacy does not deal with a form of evaluation (Brinkerhoff, 2005; Van der Aart, 2015). 
To explain its existence, Suchman (1995) has mentioned two sources of cognitive legitimacy: 
1) Comprehensibility 
2) Taken-for-grantedness 
Van der Aart (2015) has further elaborated on these two, explaining how they support 
rationale of cognitive legitimacy. Comprehensibility is associated with an organization’s 
stakeholders / constituents’ cultural model; specifically, whether they, within their cultural 
framework, can explain reasons behind its existence and its actions. Videlicet, failure to do so 
will grant low cognitive legitimacy based on comprehensibility. The second aspect of 
cognitive legitimacy: taken-for-grantedness acts complementary reason for the former aspect. 
Here the question is, whether an organization’s stakeholders/constituents can think of any 
possible alternative that can substitute its existence. If they cannot do so, constituency 
support for the organization is not due to self-interest, but “rather due to its taken-for-granted 
character” (Chaison, 2002; p.10). They will accept its existence as an inevitable fact and 
move on. 
2.3 “Chaebol” (The Korean Conglomerate) and corporate culture change in Korea: 
Understanding a historical background of the Chaebol-centered economy that has been 
prevalent in Korea so far would be necessary to understand this case. The Japanese Colonial 
Period (1910 – 1945) and the Korean War (1950 – 1953) resulted in the destruction of 
opportunities to obtain capital stock, technologies and accessible natural resources needed for 
the Korean economy (Haggard, Kang and Moon, 1997). The exportation strategy 
implemented by the Korean government was deemed to be an adequate sole solution to 
obtain foreign currency, which is mandatory to purchase the resources needed for an 
economic growth and development, such as natural resources, industrial goods, and so on. 
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The state focusing on the export-oriented economy encouraged the formation Chaebols (Lee, 
Clacher and Keasey, 2012). 
Unique characteristics of Chaebols informs us that Chaebols are (Chaebol, n.d.):  
1) are large family-owned business conglomerate in many unrelated industries 
2) tend to be global multinational own numerous international enterprises 
3) are controlled by a chairman with power over all the operations 
While the second aspect may not be unique when compared to conglomerate, trust, Konzern, 
and so on, it is the first and the third aspects that are truly notable, as they are by-product of 
economic policy deployed by Korean government in 1960s and onward. Chaebol emerged by 
establishing affiliates at several different tiers or cross-ownership among affiliates (Lee and 
Jin, 2009). It is assumed that contemporary Korean government viewed that business 
distribution channels were too fragmented, and there was a need to develop a strong business 
organization to “organize others in an efficient manner” (Jun and Rowley, 2014). 
Visvabharathy (1984) suggested, from distributional channel theory perspective, that “trading 
companies have considerable potential to increase the efficiency of export and import 
channels in developing countries.”  
As the government realized a need to create such organizations, it decided to establish a 
business model based on the Japanese GTC (JGTC) model to expand exports worldwide and 
achieve economic internationalization” (Jun and Rowley, 2014).Therefore it is undeniable 
that Chaebols, with preferential treatment from Korean government, emerged and were 
developed initially similar to structural model of Keitretsu (系列 / Japanese conglomerates) 
consisting of a main bank, a large trading company and a manufacturer. Majority of Chaebols 
hence set a big trading company as their main engine for their group as well.  
Jun and Rowley (2014) offered an example of Samsung, the biggest Chaebol of Korea to 
elaborate on its structure. To diversify its business while maintaining scale, Samsung Group 
forms a tight relationship between a trading company (GTC; Samsung Corporation), a 
manufacturing company (Samsung Heavy Industries), a mobile company (Samsung 
Electronics), an insurance & finance firm (Samsung Life Insurance) and so on. A notable 
point to focus is that Samsung Corporation as the trading company, placed “at the heart of 
Chaebols,” carried out substantial role in fostering and facilitating both international trade 
worldwide and internal development of Samsung group as a whole (Jun and Rowley, 2014). 
14 
 
Chaebols have played significant roles in Korean economic growth and development history, 
as they were the main pillars of the post 1960s government project series: the state-led ‘Five 
Year Economic Plan’ (Jung, 2004). That is to say, they eventually ended up having gigantic 
share of national output (GDP). In the data set that Cho et al (2014) presented, for an 
instance, the total sales volumes of the four largest Chaebols – Samsung, Hyundai Motors 
Company (hereafter HMC), SK and LG – accounted about 50% of Korean GDP (Hankyoreh 
2012), 17.9%, 10.6%, 9.5% and 9.1% respectively. In addition, from 1995 to 2011, it is 
notable to observe that Samsung’s sales rose about 40 times, while HMC’s 22 times and SK’s 
27 times, respectively as well, which along with previous percentage figures re-emphasize 
Chaebols’ social influence.  
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3 Data and Method 
In this section of the paper, data sets collected, methods and measures used to answer the 
research question(s) are discussed. The first subsection presents the case, elaborating details 
of what happened during the nut-rage incident. Second subsection narrates about what data 
are collected and with what tool they will be analyzed for the paper, each with different 
reasons.  
3.1 Summary of the nut-rage case 
Contextual information is essential to understand the media’s delegitimization strategies 
questioning Korean Air’s choice to handle the incident. The following subsections describe 
what happened during then, and what actions Korean Air decided to take as a result. 
 
According to the news, on 2014 December 5th Friday 0:50 AM (local time), Korean Air flight 
KE 086 (aircraft registration number HL7627) was about to head to Incheon International 
airport (IATA: ICN,) from John F. Kennedy International Airport (IATA: JFK,). Towing 
Car/tug Car was to perform pushback16, as the flight KE 086 was ready to take-off. On this 
particular day, Cho Hyun-ah (Heather Cho), the ex-vice president of Korean Air was also in 
the plane, sitting in a first-class seat. In addition, it was reported that she was under the 
influence of alcohol as well.  
As preflight-off checks were proceeding, one of the flight attendants offered Cho a bag of 
macadamia nuts as a part of flight service for first-class passengers. Hankyoreh news has 
reported that Cho has shouted “what kind of service is this?” at the attendant, as the attendant 
has asked Cho: “would you like to have macadamia nuts?” with macadamia nuts served in its 
wrapping paper, rather than in a bowl. According to the spokesman of Korean Air, Cho took it 
granted for the flight attendant to first ask her whether she wanted the nuts, and then served 
them on a plate, not in the bag, as per Korean Air in-flight service rules (Nam, 2014). When 
the flight attendant replied that her service was done according to the Korean Air manual, 
                                               
16 An airport procedure during which an aircraft is pushed backwards away from an airport gate by external 
power 
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Cho demanded the attendant to bring tablet PC which contains the manual to see whether 
what she has mentioned is right.  
Surprised by the noise in the first-class seats and to see what is going on, cabin crew chief / 
chief purser Park Chang-jin was the one who brought the manual instead. Pressured by the 
atmosphere, as the report from Hankyoreh news mentioned, chief purser Park initially 
mistyped password for the tablet, which triggered further anger of ex-vice president Cho. 
Park, to calm Cho down, was eventually able to show official Korean Air cabin service 
manual through his tablet PC, disproving Cho’s accusation. The problem was not solved 
however; rather, it intensified as Cho’s anger was worsened. As a result, she changed aim of 
her reprimand from the flight attendant to chief purser Park, shouting at him to leave the 
plane instead (M. Kim & W. Kim. 2014). Reports from Yonhap news has also supported what 
Hankyoreh has reported; Yonhap news’ coverage mentioned that Cho then proceeded to 
severely reprimanded both the female flight attendant and the chief purser, using harsh words, 
loud voice and condescending tone according to the other only first-class passenger of the 
plane at the moment. Yonhap news quoted Ms. Park, the other first-class passenger at the 
time, that Cho forced both the flight attendant and cabin chief Park to sit kneeling and listen 
to her ruthless insults with shouting, without caring that there is a customer in the exact place. 
Ms. Park has specifically stated that threatening acts including searing were done in a 
barbaric manner that “even the passengers in economy seats could hear the noise as well” 
(Yoon, 2014). According to Chosun Ilbo, Cho, in her defense, claimed during the first trial 
that happened later after the incident that she believed Park as chief purser is responsible for 
the flight attendant’s ignorance of not following manual designed by Cho (Kim, 2015). As a 
result, he, instead of the flight attendant, was forced to be ejected from the plane, which 
resulted in the flight’s take-off being delayed by 46 minutes and play arrival to Incheon 
International Airport by 18 minutes, according to the news and Korean Air. 
 
On December 8th, 9:24 PM UTC+09:00, Korean Air sent an email to its accredited newsmen 
in order to spread its first official response: ‘statement of stance1718’’ (Kim et al. 2015). 
                                               
17 Refer to appendix 1 
18 The official term was not apology at the point (“입장자료”). 
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However, the first official response backfired rather than achieving its intended purpose, 
resulting in mass criticism from both intended target (general public) and communication 
experts. As Korean Air noticed the public sentiment worsened, contrary to their hope, Cho 
Yang-ho, the chairman of Korean Air and Hanjin group, decided to conduct a press 
conference. There he has publicly apologized what Cho, Hyun-ah did, and conducted 
question-and-answer session regarding the case, in his attempt to pacify growing public anger 
and damage to its legitimacy Translation for the apology and Q&A is attached in the 
appendix. Last, on 16th of December, 2014, Korean Air released its public apology, as the 
public sentiment continued getting worse; the statement of stance released in December 8th 
and the chairman Cho, Yang-ho’s public apology on 12th were deemed to be ineffective. 
From media’s perspective, it is inferred that Korean Air regarded this public apology 
advertisement as serious necessity when it realized the two previous attempts to calm public 
sentiment failed, and the prosecution of Korea issued confiscation warrant (J. Kim, 2014). As 
most media expected, however, all three reactions taken by Korean Air backfired rather than 
pacifying the angered public. The apology advertisement, for an instance, did not result in a 
way Korean Air hoped so; the major criticisms regarding this particular apology are that the 
problems mentioned in earlier sections still, ironically, persisted in the apology, making 
sincerity questionable. 
 
Along with its official responses, Korean Air also implemented certain actions behind the 
curtain, which in the end caused various legitimacy challenges from both the media and its 
intended target of persuasion. Legally problematic one, for an instance, includes deliberate 
and systematic destruction of evidences. Threatening, compulsion/coercion and conciliation 
toward chief purser Park and the female flight attendant were also ferret out by the media and 
the prosecution. Seriousness of these aspects are rather self-explanatory. 
In non-legal perspective, possibly from the moral point of view, Korean Air’s treatment 
toward the only other first-class passenger can also be mentioned. While the directly-
involved employees of Korean Air: chief purser Park and the female flight attendant suffered, 
it is unquestionable that the other first-class passenger, whose seat was not too far from Cho’s 
during the incident, suffered from massive stress from unnecessary noise, argument, and 
terrible atmosphere as well. This eventually led her to make a complaint call to Korean Air as 
it failed to offer her a flight service equivalent to her payment, and thus was frustrated; 
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Korean Air, however, did not respond for the first two times. A board member of Korean Air 
called her back after 10 days since she made the complaint call, requesting her to claim that 
she has received a proper apology if she faces a press interview. Already frustrated with her 
experience, she was further enraged when the board member who called her offered Korean 
Air calendar and flight miniature rather than offering a proper compensation, as he was 
requesting her cooperation (D. Yoon, 2014). This eventually led the passenger to deny 
Korean Air’s request to cooperate; she revealed the case and Korean Air’s request when 
media contacted her, which heavily refuted and therefore damaged righteousness and 
legitimacy of Korean Air’s action and claims. Being the only non-Korean Air employee 
witness of the incident during the incident empowered the first-class passenger’s testimony; 
her claims demolished Korean Air’s communication strategy, further amplifying an image of 
liar that Korean Air acquired from the incident. 
3.2 Data and procedures 
To support claims to answer the research question, various communicative components, 
including but not limited to language aspects, of the case elaborated in section 3.1 will be 
analyzed. To do so will involve critical discursive analysis, which will be elaborated in the 
subsection 3.2.5. Moving on, this subsection of the paper introduces two different types of 
data that are collected. With each of them having its respective pros and cons, they are as 
followings: 
1. Korean Air and the owner family’s official statements (press releases and 
public appearances) 
2. Korean media’s commentary of the case 
 
First of all, it would be necessary to observe and analyze what Korean Air and the official 
family have officially stated and how they attempted to publicly legitimize their actions and 
words. Most of these data are publicly available – some that are no longer available for 
whatever the reason shall be are found from online achieve19 or online media that reported 
them separately. I would consider these as secondary set of data, as this set of data is an 
original data without any bias, opinion or comment added by indirectly associated 
                                               
19 These are mainly done by stakeholders (notably employees and current/potential customers) 
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stakeholders (e.g. media). It is thus believed that the data set illustrates how Korean Air and 
the owner family initially framed and/or legitimated the case – in terms of seriousness, 
diffusion and consequences. This data set has also heavily influenced remaining data sets of 
this paper – as the remaining ones are more of ‘reaction’ of this data. 
 
Second set of data set involves analyzing Korean media’s commentary of the case, including 
analysis of both official and ulterior actions taken by Korean Air that are revealed, mentioned 
in the subsection 3.1.1. As detailed in table 1, 15 different articles by 12 different media were 
used; articles from each media are given categories based on their: 
- Type: the article is from magazine, broadcasting company or newspaper company 
(online only or both online and print media)  
- Article type: whether the article was interview, editorial or report 
- Legitimacy type: which legitimacy did article focus on 
- Publication date: when it was originally published 
Table 1: List of the media for the findings section according to their types 
                                               
20 Associated with Dong-A Ilbo 
21 Associated with Chosun Ilbo 
Source Media type Article type Legitimacy type Publication date 
KBS Broadcasting Interview, 
report 
Moral 
Evaluation 
2014 
Yonhap News Newspaper Report Authorization 2015 
Jugan donga20 Magazine Editorial Rationalization 2014 
Premium chosun21 Magazine Editorial Authorization 
Moral 
Evaluation 
2014 
Kyunghyang 
Shinmun 
Newspaper Report Authorization, 
Rationalization, 
Moral 
Evaluation 
2014, 2015 
Hankook Ilbo Newspaper Editorial Authorization 2014 
MK Securities Newspaper  Normalization 2016 
Business Watch Newspaper Report Authorization, 
Rationalization 
2014 
News1 Newspaper Report Authorization 2015 
MoneyS Newspaper Report Moral 
Evaluation 
2014 
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This includes not only explanation and brief analysis of the case per se, but also media’s 
challenge of legitimacy on Korean Air’s response and epilogue of the case: ex-vice president 
Cho Hyun-ah (Heather Cho)’s trial within Korea court. Therefore in this paper, the greater 
focus will be given on this data set, as this one is regarded as the essential data set that 
deliberately supports claims to answer the research question, while first data set is regarded 
as ‘primary’ data which serves as supportive information prior to analysis. 
This particular data set are expected to offer various viewpoints of how legitimacy that 
Korean Air aimed to frame is lost, in which some may base on societal reactions of the case. 
Influence of the media – both traditional offline ones and newly emerging online ones – on 
individual’s perception on the case can be gigantic. That is to say, whether Korean Air and 
the owner family can win the media’s consent by satisfying media’s evaluation standard22 on 
their actions taken regarding the case is fairly important, as further damage on reputation will 
vary depending on their task here. 
 
Similar to how Vaara and Tienari (2008) adopted it for their paper, it is worth deploying 
critical discursive analysis (hereafter CDA) perspective for this paper as well. Defined as “a 
type of discourse analytical research that primarily studies the way social power abuse, 
dominance, and inequality are enacted, reproduced, and resisted by text and talk in the social 
and political context” (van Dijk, 2001), CDA, as discursive approach, is capable of 
demonstrating how discourse influences the processes of social changes and events by 
connecting to other social elements (Fairclough, 2003).   
Although it may not be the only option available, CDA is expected to be quite useful 
approach when dealing with controversial MNC actions, which requires critically oriented 
analysis (Vaara & Tienari, 2008). It involves a built-in critical stance, which is prevalent 
when attempting to analyze controversial societal issues. Fairclough (1989, 2003) and van 
                                               
22 This may vary – some may call for ethics, some with efficiency, and so on. 
Views & News Newspaper Report Moral 
Evaluation 
2014 
Yonhap News Newspaper Report Moral 
Evaluation 
2014,2015 
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Dijk (1998) have particularly pointed out that CDA scrutinizes the role of discourse in the 
“social constitution of power relations and structures of domination in contemporary society” 
(Vaara & Tienari, 2008; p.3). 
Along with this aspect, CDA scholars has made significant contribution to advance the 
linguistic analysis associated with micro-level discursive strategies that are employed to 
legitimate controversial cases, actions and so on (Vaara & Tienari, 2008; Rojo & van Dijk, 
1997; van Leeu wen & Wodak, 1999). 
According to Vaara and Tienrai (2008), Van Leeuwen and Wodak in 1999, based on van 
Leeuwen’s previous work: grammar of legitimation, developed distinguished models of 
legitimating strategies23. Specifically, they have elaborated their strategies into five general 
types of semantic-functional strategy: “the ways in which language functions and is used for 
the construction of legitimacy” (Vaara & Tienari, 2008; p.5).  
The five models are (Vaara & Tienari, 2008): 
1. Authorization 
2. Rationalization 
3. Moral evaluation 
4. Mythopoesis 
5. Normalization 
As the name may suggests, authorization model offers legitimacy by referencing to the 
authority, namely tradition, custom, law or individuals whom may have widely-accepted 
authority of some kind is conferred. Legitimacy via rationalization is gained, when taking 
utility from “specific actions based on knowledge claims that are accepted in a given context 
as relevant” (Vaara & Tienari, 2008; p.5). Moral evaluation legitimatizes an organization’s 
action by referring to specific value systems that offer moral basis needed for legitimation. 
Legitimation through mythopoesis is conducted via narratives; as the term narrative alludes, 
telling stories or constructing necessary narrative structure is the mean of indicating how the 
discussed issue in question relates to the past or the future for the process of legitimation. 
Last model: normalization, from Vaara et al.’s 2006 paper, “seeks to render something 
legitimate by exemplarity”; it is a method of imbuing legitimacy by referring to similar 
                                               
23 For the purpose of the paper, same tools will be used to analyze de-legitimating strategies as well 
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practices, precedence and/or actions occurred in the past (what Vaara et al. referred as 
‘retrospective’ references) and also those expected to occur in the nearby future (what Vaara 
et al. referred as ‘prospective’ references).  
They can be – in fact quite often – intertwined in specific texts and multiple legitimation, 
which is quite notable. The importance of these strategies is recognized as they offer us an 
understanding of how sense-making for the legitimacy process is conducted and applied at 
the textual level. Therefore it can be claimed that CDA perspective contributes to illustrate 
ways in which “specific ideas and practices are legitimated in communication in and around 
MNCs” (Vaara & Tienari. 2008; p.8; Geppert, 2003; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). 
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4 Findings 
In this section, the results of the study are presented. Out of five legitimacy CDA tools 
mentioned, four are mainly employed to discuss delegitimization of Korean Air’s 
countermeasures after the incident: authorization, rationalization, moral evaluation and 
normalization24. Each tool is supported with strategic media texts to elaborate on process of 
delegitimization of the case. 
4.1 Delegitimization constructed through authorization 
The strategic CDA tool to discuss consequential legitimacy in this section is authorization. 
Authorization relies on reference to institutionalized authority, which could be personal 
(referring to a widely-accepted expert, for an instance) or impersonal (tradition, law, 
knowledge, and so on) (Vaara & Tienari, 2008). Authorization in this section mainly served a 
role of delegitimization; the media texts often referred to relevant Korean laws when 
conducting strategic delegitimization of Korean Air’s actions.  
The major breach that the media see Cho has conducted are: altering course of airplane, 
coercion and business interference. Prior to media text analysis in upcoming subsections, the 
first that needs to be done to understand how delegitimization challenges proceeded through 
is therefore to elaborate the notion and consequences of relevant terms and each crime. Of all 
mentioned in the appendices 5,6 and 7, there are particular portion of the terms that need to 
be focused. The first essential term is an ‘aircraft captain’ which according to Aviation Act - 
Article 50 is:  
“Each person responsible for the flight safety of an aircraft (hereinafter referred to as 
"plane captain") shall direct and supervise the crew of the aircraft” (appendix 6).  
Second is the term “in flight” from Article 2 of Aviation Safety and Security Act, due to its 
remarkable impact on the legitimacy challenge: 
“The term "in flight" means from the time all the doors of an airplane close after 
passengers aboard the airplane until the time all the doors of the airplane open for 
passengers to disembark.” 
With those in mind, now, let’s observe each crime; first one is Article 42 (Crime of Altering 
Course of Airplane), which according to the Aviation Safety and Security Act is explained as:  
                                               
24 Mythopoesis is briefly mentioned, but with no supporting strategic media text. 
24 
 
“Any person who impedes the normal flight of an airplane by forcing the airplane in flight 
to alter course by a deceptive plan or power shall be punished by imprisonment for not less 
than one year but not more than ten years [Article 42 (Crime of Altering Course of 
Airplane)].” 
Based on Criminal Acts Chapter XXXIV Crimes Against Credit, Business And Auction, 
Article 314 (Interference with Business) , on the other hand, is shown as: 
“A person who obstructs another from exercising his right by violence or intimidation, or 
coerces one to do any unobliged work, shall be punished by imprisonment for not more 
than five years.” 
Last but not least, Criminal Acts Chapter XXXVII Crimes of Obstructing Another From 
Exercising His Right define Article 324 (Coercion) as: 
“A person who obstructs another from exercising his right by violence or intimidation, or 
coerces one to do any unobliged work, shall be punished by imprisonment for not more 
than five years.” 
 
Suchman (1995), Heidhues et al (2012) and Brinkerhoff (2005) have mentioned that personal 
legitimacy considers personal reputation, status and charisma of organizational leader and 
staff. While the other aspects of normative legitimacy are concerned about ‘action’ aspect, 
personal traits are given greater concern when conducting delegitimization strategies based 
on personal legitimacy. A legitimacy challenge via authorization, in this circumstance, can be 
initiated by impersonal factors (reference to a set of relevant laws) and personal factors 
(reference to an expert). In that sense, both the first official reaction (the statement of stance) 
and the third official reaction (the public apology advertisement) faced the media’s critic 
based on legal aspects, as more contradictory evidences against Korean Air were discovered 
over time. These eventually allowed the media to opt disauthorization strategy to challenge 
legitimacy issues which were particularly linked with questioning towards not only Cho’s 
qualification, charisma and leadership as the vice president, but also to those of Korean Air’s 
board of management members. 
An easy-to-overlook matter, specifically from the second sub-subsection of the first official 
reaction, is Korean Air’s attempt to nullify criticism associated with Cho’s act of 
arrogation/misfeasance and to dodge legal responsibility of breaching the Article 42 of the 
Aviation Safety and Security Act. To do so, Korean Air has publicly announced to the media 
its claim that the principal agent of the aircraft return was the captain, as it is his right and 
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responsibility to do so, whether such claim sounds convincing enough to persuade the 
relevant stakeholders. In furtherance of strongly emphasizing that there were no procedural 
issues, Korean Air added that the decision to do so was conducted as a result of consultation25 
between the captain and Cho (Park, 2014). Its attempt, however, was not viewed legitimate 
by the general public and the media; Business Watch, for an instance, has criticized the board 
member’s decision to release such buck passing official reaction regarding the case, as it 
seems a misleading choice for the long-term interest of Korean Air as a company, and for its 
stakeholders. It sets up negative and criticizing mood throughout its article by indirectly 
condemning them attempting to dodge their responsibility (and potentially their inappropriate 
usage of leadership), mentioning that: 
“… through this, Korean Air decided to make a scapegoat of the then aircraft captain to 
protect ex-vice president Cho26” (translated; Yoon, 2014).  
While the aspects of Cho, Hyun-ah and Korean Air board members’ leadership are questioned 
as they shirked what deemed to be their responsibility, further evidences revealed support the 
media’s legitimacy challenge via authorization; one notable evidence to take a look at is an 
arraignment from the Korean prosecution that Kyunghyang Shinmun acquired with a help of 
an incumbent National Assembly member Seo, Young-kyo from The Minjoo Party of 
Korea27. The arraignment confirmed several important statements which refuted Korean Air’s 
rhetoric and therefore negatively influenced legitimacy and legal liability defense that Korean 
Air was planning. Kyunghyang Shinmun’s article revealed direct speeches associated with 
flight route obstruction, business interference and coercion from the ex-vice president Cho 
Hyun-ah, further empowering delegitimization of personal legitimacy involved with the case. 
The collection of her speeches to be shown below, which were critically impactful to 
challenge Cho and Korean Air’s legitimacy, are as follows (Goo & Kim, 2015): 
                                               
25 It turned out as a lie later in 2015; 
http://news.khan.co.kr/kh_news/khan_art_view.html?artid=201501160600015 
26 Hangul: “이를 통해 조 부사장에게 쏠린 '월권, 직권남용'의 비난 화살에 기장이라는 방패를 
세웠다.” 
27 Hangul: 더불어민주당 
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“(shaking her fingers at the female flight attendant) Hey you, search for the manual! Go on 
your knees and find it, now! I can’t let someone who is not well-aware of the manual stay 
on this aircraft, take this bitch off the aircraft!28” (translated)  
“(shouting at the chief purser Park) Stop this aircraft right now. I will not let this aircraft to 
take-off. Tell the captain to stop the aircraft, now!29” (translated) 
When the chief purser Park attempted to dissuade Cho from ordering to return the aircraft, 
saying:  
“we cannot stop the aircraft as it is entering the runway30,” (translated) 
Cho replied with scold, answering him:  
“I don’t care. You attempt to defy me? How you dare to speak back to me?31” (translated) 
She repeatedly added: 
 “I said, stop the aircraft now!32” (translated) 
It was also revealed in this arraignment that the chief purser Park, since he was deeply 
pressured and threatened by Cho, requested a need to return the plane to the captain, after the 
flight has already moved to the runway. He told the then captain that: 
“The vice president is angry, swearing at the crew members due to inflight services. She is 
highly demanding an ejection of a crew member33” (Goo & Kim, 2015).  
Combination of information revealed by the above-mentioned arraignment from the media 
and additional testimony from the Korean Air employees describing the incident allow us to 
conjecture, that Cho being present on the aircraft during the incident very likely, through 
                                               
28 Hangul: 동시에 삿대질을 하면서 “야 너, 거기서 매뉴얼 찾아. 무릎 꿇고 찾으란 말이야. 서비스 
매뉴얼도 제대로 모르는데, 안 데리고 갈 거야. 저 X 내리라고 해”라고 외쳤다. 
29 Hangul:조 전 부사장은 “이 비행기 당장 세워. 나 이 비행기 안 띄울 거야. 당장 기장한테 
비행기 세우라고 연락해”라고 호통쳤다 
30 Hangul: 박씨는 “이미 비행기가 활주로에 들어서기 시작해 비행기를 세울 수 없다”고 만류했다. 
31 Hangul: 하지만 조 전 부사장은 “상관없어. 네가 나한테 대들어. 얻다 대고 말대꾸야”라고 
꾸짖었다. 
32 Hangul: “내가 세우라잖아”라는 말도 3~4 차례 반복했다. 
33 Hangul: “부사장이 객실 서비스와 관련해 욕을 하며 화를 내고 있고 승무원의 하기를 강력히 
요구하고 있다”고 추가 보고했다. 
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coercion, constricted and interfered the cabin crews’ exercise of their righteous power. There 
are several aspects that were therefore pinpointed out by the media; first is the fact that the 
ex-vice president caused the incident during the pre-flight checks – and thus the incident was 
conducted ‘in flight’, according to the description of the case. Second and most commonly 
opinionated view among the media is regarding Cho’s act of arrogation. If anyone makes a 
final decision in a plane, it must be a captain’s right to do so, not any executives of the plane-
owning company. Chosun Ilbo quoted Professor34 Ham, Dae-young’s opinion to emphasize 
such view: 
“aircraft captain has authority to dispose of any happenings in the aircraft;”  
for that the captain’s authority should be respected that:  
“even a president of a nation is not supposed to disobey the captain’s order when in an 
aircraft35” (translated; J. Choi, 2014).  
Needless to say, the owner family members are of no exception from this rule (Ha, 2014).  
It is important to notice that, ironically, Cho was on the flight in the capacity of a passenger, 
not of an aircraft captain. Videlicet, in legal sense she is no different from any other 
passengers; her then title of vice president during the incident does not – and should not – 
grant her a legitimate legal right to return the aircraft to eject chief purser. It was of no 
surprise, according to Yonhap News, the ex-vice president Cho was found guilty and 
sentenced 1 year in prison at the first trial, though in an appeal she was acquitted on the 
particular crime of flight route obstruction, whilst being sentenced to 10 months in a jail with 
a stay of execution for two years for other crimes (Yim, 2015). In their attempt to further de-
legitimate Korean Air’s defense, various media including News1 reported what the 
department of justice commented after the first trial specifically regarding the crime of 
business interference, as it further strengthens the impact of the court’s ruling toward the 
general public: 
“The ex-vice president Cho was the crew members’ superior responsible for inflight 
service business affairs. However, even when considering that she had power given to re-
schedule the cabin crews’ work and even exclude them if and where needed, she should 
                                               
34 Visiting professor of College of Aviation, Jungwon University.   
35 Hangul: “항공기 안에서 벌어지는 일들에 대한 모든 처분 권한은 기장에게 있습니다. 
대통령이라도 어쩔 수 없어요.” 
28 
 
have exercised her power in more appropriate manner prior to boarding on the 
aircraft36”(translated; Park, 2015). 
Hankook Ilbo as well has given a strong criticism in its short editorial, raising concern 
towards appropriateness of Cho’s action which acted against not only the laws but Korean 
Air’s legitimacy defense: 
“Even when she was in the airplane that is owned by the company where she is employed 
as the vice president, even when she was in charge of in-flight service, there are minimum 
rules that must be respected as a passenger. It is very surprising to see such arrogant 
attitude when the flight during the incident, full of 250 passengers, was already proceeding 
to take-off37 (translated; “[Editorial],” 2014).” 
 
While the previous subsection addressed the media’s legitimacy challenges towards personal 
legitimacy mainly on basis of impersonal factors: the relevant Korean laws, this subsection 
will address the media texts that questioned legitimacy of Korean Air’s procedures taken to 
handle the case during and after the incident via reference to experts and their knowledge.  
In the media text provided by Yonhap news, the views from many professionals in the field of 
economics, consulting and communication are presented to strengthen its legitimacy 
challenge toward the case. A reference to Choi, Chul-gyu the representative of Human 
Solution Group38 was quite notable to challenge the procedural legitimacy of Korean Air’s 
actions taken regarding the case, particularly towards the official reactions taken. In the 
public apology from Korean Air, there was no direct mentioning of assaulter of the incident, 
making the apology a hollow one. From this, whether Korean Air properly understood the 
gravity of the situation is questionable, better yet it would be plausible to claim it 
                                               
36 Hangul: "조 전 부사장이 객실 승무원에 대한 상사로서 업무를 총괄하는 지위에 있었다. 그리고 
업무배제와 스케줄 조정 권한 등을 가지고 있었다고 하더라도 항공기 탑승 전에 마땅한 절차에 
따라 진행했어야 했다" 
37 Hangul: “아무리 자신이 부사장으로 있는 회사의 항공기이고, 스스로 기내서비스를 총괄하는 
위치에 있다 하더라도 승객으로서 지켜야 할 최소한의 규칙이 있다. 더구나 250 명의 승객이 
탑승해 있었고 이미 항공기가 출발한 상황이었다니 그 안하무인의 태도에 놀라움을 금할 수 
없다.” 
38 Korean Consultant Company, according to Yonhap news. 
29 
 
intentionally ignored the gravity. Choi therefore reviewed the apology advertisement to be 
quite deceptive to the audience; in the Yonhap news’ article, he asserted that: 
“the apology ads from Korean Air not only lack a clear reference of principal agent and 
object of the apology, but also misses emotional sympathy toward the victim of the 
incidents. It just does not feel like a real and sincere apology39” (Y. Kim, 2014).  
To offer theoretical justification for his view, Choi emphasized that a need for firms to adhere 
to ‘CAP’ principal when making an apology advertisement. Elaborating on what the ‘CAP’ 
principal is, he explained that ‘C’ stands for ‘care and concern’, ‘A’ stands for ‘action’ and ‘P’ 
stands for ‘Prevention’ (Y. Kim, 2014). He briefly described the components ‘C’ and ‘P’ as a 
sense of apology and promise of recurrence prevention, respectively. While the components 
‘C’ and ‘P’ are indeed important, the most important one, according to Choi’s claim, is the 
‘A’ component. That is to say, the ‘A’ component: Action is the part that elaborates on what 
specific actions will be taken to prevent a similar happening in the future. Choi expounded 
his view by stating:  
“when looking at a wrong apology, it usually lacks the ‘A’ component while it has the ‘C’ 
component. Korean Air’s apology advertisement is a prime example that fits this 
observation” (translated).  
He further added:  
“Only when there is the ‘A’ component (in an apology) vividly noticeable, the audience 
may witness ‘there may possibly be a notable change (to rectify wrong doings)’40” 
(translated).  
With principal narrated so far, legitimacy challenge was conducted via the expert offering a 
suggestion of what should have been done instead. Yonhap news viewed that the procedurally 
inappropriate apology hindered retrieving the situation for Korean Air; Choi, who represent 
Yonhap news’ voice in this case, hence stressed: 
                                               
39 최철규 대표는 “사과의 주체도, 대상도 명확하지 않고 피해당한 사람에 대한 감정적 공감이 
빠져 있어 진짜 사과라는 느낌이 들지 않는다”고 말했다 
40 Hangul: 최 대표는 "잘못된 사과문을 보면 A 는 빠지고 C 만 들어가는데 대한항공의 사과 
광고가 그렇다"면서 "A 가 있어야 뭔가 제대로 달라지겠구나 이런 걸 느낄 수 있다"고 말했다. 
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“Being honest and sincere may seem like a way to suffer a loss but in a long run, it is the 
way to reduce potential risks41” (translated; Y. Kim, 2014). 
Reference to authorization to judge legitimacy issue can often be confused with that 
employing rationalization, as the experts referred for the authorization often seeks to bring 
utility from their theories to rationalize their views. Both often share similar areas of analysis; 
they, however, differ depending on which aspect is given a greater focus. Yonhap chose Choi 
particularly for his expertise in corporate communication and consulting, which adds a 
significant amount of credibility per se to persuade its target audience. 
4.2 Delegitimization through rationalization  
While rationalization as one of the CDA tools stands on the basis of common sense, it can 
also be stated that obtaining legitimacy through rationalization is also achieved by taking 
utility from “specific actions based on knowledge claims that are accepted in a given context 
as relevant” (Vaara & Tienari, 2008; p.5). In this chapter, the role of rationalization was to 
depict how the media, mainly Jugan-Donga, evaluated and de-legitimated the actions taken 
by Korean Air and its management during and after the incident. 
This section, however, differs from the others, due to its structural setups caused by two 
factors. First factor is that while all three official statements are important, majority of the 
media commonly agreed, after their own diagnosis of the cases, the first official response (the 
statement of stance; hereafter FO1) conducted in December 8th of 2014 was the most crucial 
moment that Korean Air could have utilized to determine the atmosphere of public sentiment 
towards the case. Therefore, in consideration of its importance and its chronological order 
(the first official response from Korean Air), the statement of stance is the first to be analyzed 
word-by-word in the following subsections to evaluate how well – in terms of both end result 
and procedure – Korean Air adhered to their role as flight service provider. Second, the 
rationalization aspects of the media texts employ business knowledge including but not 
limited to those from management, consulting and public relations to observe how the actions 
taken were contrary to the business norms and practices including but not limited to 
management, consulting and public relations. That is to say, in this section, the first official 
response (the statement of stance), which act as a defensive corporate account, will also be 
                                               
41 Hangul: “투명하고 솔직하면 손해 볼 것 같지만 길게 보면 리스크를 줄인다.” 
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presented as a complementary text – at least certain specific parts – for the media text, prior 
to presenting the latter. This is to highlight and strengthen the legitimacy challenge that the 
media text will provide42. 
 
In assessment of eligibility of Korean Air’s legitimation strategies, normative legitimacy is 
most critiqued and commentated legitimacy by the media for this case. The first to be 
discussed through tactics of rationalization is consequential legitimacy, which in short 
summary understood as legitimacy based on how consequences of actions taken by an 
organization are viewed. This subsection will discuss how the media text collected explicitly 
showed the way media, through use of first two ‘A’ elements: apology and apologia proposed 
in Jugan Donga, challenged legitimacy of Korean Air’s actions: ‘has Korean Air done the 
right thing?’  
Media commonly regarded that Korean Air failed to utilize opportunity it had prior to 
conducting the statement of stance, making number of questionable choices which evoked 
morality associated challenges instead. The immediate criticism that followed the statement 
was on its discursive elements. Various media has pointed out that the phrases used in the 
stance focused more on justifying Cho’s behavior, rather than factually depicting what has 
happened and what Korean Air would do accordingly. Business Watch, for an instance, 
subtitled its article as “…bizarre apology from Korean Air, stating ‘righteous warning that 
was immoderately conducted43’” (translated; Yoon, 2014) 
In many cases, from the gathered material, the media tend to either quote professionals 
(professors, consultants, etc.) in public relations, risk management and other relevant areas or 
let them contribute to write editorial and/or analysis of the case to conduct analysis of Korean 
Air’s actions in comparison to business practices and norms, which act as rationalization 
based delegitimization.  
                                               
42 This is also to prevent readers from a hassle to go back to appendix to read through the first official response, 
which may interrupt the flow of reading. 
43 Hangul:대한항공 황당 사과 "지나쳤지만 지적은 당연" 
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In the case of Jugan Donga, Kim, Ho, the representative of THE LAB h44 was in charge for 
its article to challenge legitimacy of Korean Air’s first official response in comparison to 
business norms in conducting apology. To do so, the strategic media text from Jugan Donga 
took utility from the notion of “A” elements: apology, apologia and actions, respectively, 
which acted as a basis for rationalization-base delegitimization criticism. Its article started 
with a criticism, raising a question towards dubious effect of FO1: 
“If one is to commit a proper apology, s/he must be able to correctly diagnosis the external 
circumstances and be able to accept his/her own mistake. As this nut-rage case has shown, 
the actual victims and the public sentiment cannot be settled with just one mere apology. 
Think, why did the apology backfired, even when a head of a big corporate and his 
daughter took the plunge and decided to apologize. The general public prioritize whether 
the directly involved participant (assailant in this case) truly thinks s/he has done wrong 
and apologize over a mere fact that the person of ‘high social status’ has conducted open 
apology45” (translated; H, Kim. 2014) 
As mentioned earlier in this subsection. there is a need to make reference to specific parts of 
the official response to make the legitimacy challenge from the strategic media text clear. 
Counting based on Korean language, the entire statement is composed of 134 words. To start 
off, the first subsection of the point one, which belongs to the first element: apology, contains 
total 26 words in Korean, which is about 19% of the entire statement: 
“(We Korean Air) apologizes to our passengers for the inconvenience caused by the return 
of the aircraft, as it was an immoderation, even though the circumstance was not an 
emergency46 (translated).” 
The first and very immediate odd aspect about this sentence, when especially viewing the 
sentence in Korean, is that it lacks subject, as of the principal agent of an action – who is 
apologizing to the audience? In Korean, the above-mentioned particular sentence, when 
                                               
44 Consultant organization specializing in areas of leadership and organizational communication; 
http://thelabh.com/ (the site is in Korean) 
45 Hangul: 사과를 제대로 하려면 일단 외부 상황을 정확히 판단하고, 자기 잘못을 인정할 수 
있어야 한다. 땅콩회항 사건에서도 보듯, 실제 피해자나 여론은 사과문 하나로 진정되지 않는다. 
큰맘먹고 대기업 오너 회장과 딸이 사과했지만 왜 역효과가 났을까. 시민들은 ‘높은 사람’의 공개 
사과를 보면서 사과했다는 사실 자체보다 당사자가 정말로 자신이 잘못했다고 생각하고 사과하는 
것인지에 주목한다. 
46 Hangul:비상 상황이 아니었음에도 불구하고 항공기가 다시 제자리로 돌아와 승무원을 하기시킨 
점은 지나친 행동이었으며, 이로 인해 승객 분들께 불편을 끼쳐드려 사과 드립니다. 
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literally translated, sounds as if the aircraft returned from the JFK airport runway with ‘its 
own will’, contrast to how it is translated in the appendix. When translating this sentence, a 
phrase “we Korean Air” in a bracket had to be added, as not only it was grammatically 
needed but also to highlight a point that Korean Air’s intention is assumed to be sheltering 
Cho from the responsibility of the incident by letting the company to apologize instead47. As 
this sentence challenges both commonly practiced public relation rules and common senses, 
intention of this wording, and therefore morality of Korean Air was strongly questioned by 
Jugan Donga: 
“The expression ‘by the return of the aircraft’ shows Korean Air uses aircraft as the 
principal agent, rather than vice-president, which clearly indicates their legal concerns. 
This apology is clearly awkward, bad enough to make the audience to speculate that the 
wording of the sentence is designed meticulously to guard Cho from criticism48” 
(translated; H, Kim. 2014).”  
This alludes that Korean Air – well, at least its the owner family – is willing to prioritize 
saving Cho, Hyun-ah over a nullifying bad reputation that company may face and wide-
spread discontent among its workforce. Other media found Korean Air’s decision to be 
irrational, as such decision is likely to worsen public sentiment. Business Watch’s analysis 
spots the very similar point, claiming that: 
“We can clearly see the company’s willingness (?) to shelter Cho from the series of process 
regarding the incident49” (translated; Yoon, 2014). 
Moving on to the next element: apologia, there are 87 words in Korean (65% of the wordings 
in the statement) which belong to it. Based on his own risk managing consultant knowledge, 
experience and industry expertise, Kim, Ho the author of Jugan-Donga’s article stated that an 
amount of words assigned for apologia element in a public apology should not exceed 25% in 
general. If so, then the public apology is very likely regarded as brazen one rather than a 
                                               
47 just like how the third official response: the apology advertisement was translated, as both the first and third 
response had same intention 
48 Hangul: ‘항공기가 다시 제자리로 돌아와’라는 표현에서 주어를 부사장이 아닌 항공기로 해놓은 
것은 법적인 고려인 듯한데, 누가 봐도 어색하며 잘못을 비켜가기 위한 주도면밀한 사과라는 
것을 알 수 있다. 
49 Hangul: 사건 일련의 과정에서 조 부사장은 뒤로 빼놓겠다는 의지(?)가 역력하게 보인다. 
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sincere one, damaging morality aspect. Considering that, take a look at the following 
sentence (the second main point of the statement), which argues that: 
“The executives of Korean Air are responsible to inspect in-flight services and security 
concerns when they are on the flight.” (translated) 
This is the starting point of Korean Air’s claim to justify Cho’s deed during the incident, 
which seems to act as rhetorical setup for follow-up subsections. Interestingly however, while 
the phrase itself sounds normal – in fact, it is undoubtedly somewhat ‘too’ reasonable claim 
to make –, evidences that were already revealed prior to the statement challenges its 
rightfulness. Inevitably, the statement itself faced fair amount of sarcasm and ridicules, 
ranging from negative comments from the on/offline audiences, the media and even from one 
of its competitors – Air Asia50. The Huffpost, one of the media which also evaluated the 
statement, concluded with a question towards whether Korean Air has done the ‘right’ thing 
as a company: 
“‘The executives of Korean Air are responsible to inspect in-flight services and security 
concerns when they are on the flight’ – was it (Korean Air) truly intending to apologize?51” 
(translated;  
The remaining parts of the statement of stance will be dealt on next subsection: normative 
legitimacy – procedural legitimacy. 
 
Procedural legitimacy, on the other hand, discusses whether an organization employs 
societally valued, accepted and regarded righteous method to achieve goals specific to itself; 
what Brinkoff (2005) mentioned as “doing things right.” Continuing from the previous 
subsection which dealt with consequential legitimacy of the first official reaction through the 
notion of ‘apology’ and ‘apologia’ elements, this subsection will elaborate on what procedural 
aspects of the case contributed to further rationalization-based delegitimization of Korean Air 
from the media via ‘apologia’ and ‘action’ elements. Another important ground to keep in 
                                               
50During his press conference in Seoul on 10th of December, 2014, AirAsia founder and Group CEO Tony 
Fernandes stated in an opening remark, “If we offer honey butter chip (a snack with enormous popularity in 
Korea then) to our clients, we’ll serve it in a package because we are a simple and kind carrier,” implying the 
Korean Air’s macadamia nut scandal and how non-sense and illegitimate it was (Y. Kim, 2014). 
51 Hangul: “임원으로서 문제 제기 및 지적은 당연한 일”이라는 대한항공의 사과문은 정말 사과를 
하려고 쓴 글일까? 
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mind for this subsection is that while rationalization is indeed the main focus, the gathered 
material associated with the statement of stance tends to be interrelated with moralization in 
some extent as well, as moral values support rationalization-based challenges as well.  
Prior to discussing the strategic media texts towards Korean Air’s failure to utilize existing 
business norms (and thus rationalization-based delegitimization), lets take a look at corporate 
defensive account. While the sentences in the statement of stance attempts to legitimize the 
ex-vice president Cho’s deed through indirect pro-Cho nuance of the phrases, the subsection 
of main section 2 from the statement of stance, as a part of apologia, deliberately attempts to 
persuade its audience why the procedure taken during the incident – Cho’s action – was done 
‘legitimately.’ The pinnacle of Korean Air’s desperate attempt to legitimatize Cho’s behavior 
becomes very clear, when observing the second subsection of point two from FO1: 
“The executives of Korean Air are responsible to inspect in-flight services and security 
concerns when they are on the flight. It is natural and reasonable for the ex-vice president 
Cho Hyun-ah, an executive who is responsible for inflight services and meals, to point out 
and problematize seemingly troublesome conducts.” 
It is evident that, particularly from these sub-subsections discussed so far, Korean Air 
attempted to simplify the framing of the case as ‘boss penalizing irresponsible subordinate 
who did not follow company instruction,’ in order to secure its procedural legitimacy. 
However, this part of the statement still brought the media’s criticism; Jugan-Donga 
particularly reported on the fact that Korean Air decided to focus on ‘sheltering’ Cho, rather 
than clearly stating countermeasure consist of ‘five W's and one H52’ regarding the incident. 
For an instance, it pointed out that repetition, a common rhetorical device, of specific term: 
responsible (or responsibility) is apparent in the entire statement (Yoon, 2014). The word 
responsibility, in its various grammatical form, seems to be the main message that Korean Air 
desires to revolve around, in an effort to boost public sentiment on this incident. In that sense 
it is not too surprising that Korean Air repeated the exact statement of “the executives of 
Korean Air are responsible to inspect in-flight services and security concerns when they are 
on the flight” twice.  
Last, 21 words from the statement of stance were dedicated to the element: actions, which is 
about 16% of the statement of stance. The third main point of FO1 and its subsection claim: 
                                               
52 Who, What, Why, When, Where and How. 
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“We will make sure to raise the quality of our service via thorough training” (translated). 
“We, Korean Air, will make sure to improve our customer service and safety concerns via 
thorough training of our flight attendants” (translated). 
The overall tone of FO1 is quite determined, as if it claims that the problems associated with 
the case can be solely handled by improving the quality of the service, which is quite far from 
what the audiences of the statement were expecting. It attempts to strongly convey a message 
that Cho is responsible to commit her duty as the executive responsible for inflight services 
and meals, rather than the fact she ordered chief purser to be dropped off for preposterous 
reason. Contrary to what Korean Air hoped, Jugan Donga diagnosed that both the main point 
and its subsection commit a problem of drawing unpersuasive conclusion; they are very 
likely regarded as a blatant attempt to change the subject of the statement, hoping to divert 
attention of its audience. While they fit to the element: action, as they propose what will be 
done in the future as a response to the case, they still fail to contribute to legitimization 
attempt that the statement of stance was seeking. It states that: 
“…(the FO1 was) far from the core aspect of the problem: ex-vice president’s faults; it 
rather claimed ‘(Korean Air) will make sure to raise the quality of our service via thorough 
training’. This is a failure”53 (translated; Yoon, 2014). 
Another viewpoint to take is that it is not only the business experts from the outside who 
noticed Korean Air’s FO1 failed to adopt business knowledge commonly accepted. Hence the 
media also challenged the procedural aspect of the FO1 by offering viewpoints of different 
business expertise: Korean Air employees. Kyunghyang Shinmun in particular, via strongly 
condemning voices of Korean Air’s labor union, expressed the statement failed to achieve its 
goals. Of all refutations from the employees regarding the case, two notable (partial) quotes 
from the union includes (translated; “[Full text],” 2014): 
(refuting the second main point) “Was the issue of macadamia nut serious enough issue to 
put the 250 passengers to inconvenience? You don’t just 'shit out' the words. If you want to 
cover the matter, at least try to give more logical explanation.54” 
                                               
53 Hangul: “… 사안의 핵심인 부사장 잘못과는 거리가 먼 ‘서비스 질을 높이고 승무원 교육을 
강화’하겠다는 내용이었다. 역시 실패한 부분이다.” 
54 Hangul: “마카데미아 땅콩 문제가 고성과 고함으로 다른 승객들에게 불쾌감과 위협감을 주고 
250 명의 승객의 시간을 점유할 만큼 민감한 문제였나? 말이라고 내뱉고 배설하면 그만이 아니다. 
일을 덮을려면 좀 더 논리적으로 정황에 맞게 변명해라.” 
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(refuting the third main point of the statement and its subsection) “Thorough training is 
only needed for the one who caused this incident. No need to conduct training for the flight 
attendants. All that needs to be done is cultivation of mind and ethics for that executive 
board member55”  
While reporting the employee’s comments, Kyunghyang Shinmun implied: who would – if 
especially s/he was directly influenced by the incident – appreciate to see what-so-called “the 
statement of stance”, which basically is a defense document for the ex-vice president Cho in 
the likeness of apology.  
Overall, the media claim that the FO1 failed to do serve strategic values; it as a procedural 
failure was neither far-sighted nor strategic, failing to convince its audience to agree with its 
explanation of procedure that Korean Air adopted to handle the case. The fact that Korean Air 
initially offered information that is inaccurate, flawed and thus favorable particularly to ex 
vice-president Cho to its stakeholders, and decided to remain silent until prosecutors started 
an investigation could be interpreted as deliberate attempt to prioritize securing ‘safe-spot’ for 
Cho over interests of its stakeholders. Videlicet, at least from the media’s perspective, the 
FO1 could be regarded as blatant deceit and consequently challenge toward the stakeholders, 
resulting in notable damage in exchange legitimacy. After all, like how Kim, Ho of Jugan 
Donga evaluated: 
“(…this statement of stance) was destined to be a brazen apology fooling the audience, 
quality and quantity wise56” (H. Kim, 2014). 
4.3 Legitimation through moral evaluation 
Moral evaluation, often interchangeably used with the term moralization, as a CDA tool 
constructs legitimacy by referring to certain value system which suggests moral basis for 
legitimation (Vaara & Tienari, 2008). By its nature, discourses are commonly legitimated 
through moral evaluation; other CDA tools addressed in the paper include moral evaluation in 
some extent. However, in this section, a greater and explicit focus on legitimacy challenge 
from morality-based value system will be explored. Addressing the media articles that 
highlight Cho and Korean Air as the assaulter, portraying the chief purser, the female flight 
                                               
55 Hangul: “철저한 교육은 이 일을 일으킨 본인만 각성하면 된다. 승무원 교육은 필요없다. 
해당임원의 인격 수양 및 윤리의식만 고치면 된다.” 
56 Hangul: …양적, 질적으로 모두 뻔뻔한 사과가 될 운명이었다.  
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attendant, the first-class passenger and the rest of the passenger as the victim allow us to 
observe how the media challenged Korean Air’ legitimacy defense via moral evaluation. The 
central value systems to be covered, as discursive practices of moralization, throughout this 
section include following: 
1) Personnel in the top management position must not lose sight of the fact that 
business must not be mixed with pleasure 
2) Humanistic discourse: Legally assured rights of an individual as an employee 
should not be hindered by an interest of a company 
3) Sincerity of an apology must be clear, with shift action. 
 
As previously defined in Suchman (1995)’s literature, exchange legitimacy is gained 
when constituents / stakeholders benefit from organizational policies. To wit, constituents can 
also take exchange legitimacy back if the policy by their supporting organization harm them 
instead. Unlike most other subsections in this paper, this subsection will deal with both 
pragmatic exchange legitimacy and normative personal legitimacy simultaneously under 
central moral value of: ‘Personnel in the top management position must not lose sight of the 
fact that business must not be mixed with pleasure’, as the both legitimacy issues are heavily 
interrelated, and thus are important issues to be reckoned with. The legitimacy challenge in 
this section evolves around both ex-vice president Cho and the first-class passenger, who has 
noticed Korean Air and ex-vice president Cho acted against her interest as the customer. 
As elaborated earlier in the section 3.13, the first-class passenger was another notable victim 
of the case, whose remarkable influence on legitimacy challenge should not be 
underestimated. Purchasing first class ticket for a flight service costs a lot more compared to 
that of an economy seat. Needless to say, customer may expect at least the same or greater 
amount of utility value from what s/he purchases; in this case, first-class passengers pay such 
amount in an exchange for a pleasant flight experience. That is to say, the incident and the 
reaction taken by Korean Air is likely to be considered breach of pragmatic exchange 
legitimacy against the first-class passenger, not only by the passenger per se but by the media 
as well. 
Various media commonly agreed that Cho’s claim that she was truly concerned about in-
flight services during the official reactions, investigation and trials to defend herself, failed to 
appeal her innocence when considering how her actions were against with the interest of the 
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passengers. Various media including MoneyS argue that Cho – ironically as the board 
member who is responsible for inflight services – should have implemented any of the 
following actions (Choi, 2014): 
1. Asking for a pardon before and after the incident to the other first-class passenger.  
2. Contacting the first-class passenger (either face-to-face or phone call) by herself 
immediately, rather than letting the passenger contacting the call center due to her 
frustration of poor service. 
3. Offering an appropriate compensation rather than a valueless one. 
4. Not requesting a shameless request. 
As depicted earlier, however, none of above was achieved, resulting in two points: 1. Cho as 
the person in charge was completely oblivious of business and private matter, indicating 
potential legitimacy challenge arising from personal attributes; 2. the passenger’s denial to 
cooperate, which can be interpreted as her exercise of rights to take exchange legitimacy 
back. The media viewed that the first-class passenger’s response per se refutes and negates 
Korean Air’s legitimacy defense; to demonstrate how pragmatic exchange legitimacy was 
damaged as a result of violation of first-class passenger’s right, Kyeonghyang Shinmun 
decided to present parts of what the prosecution presented during the first trial: Kakao Talk57 
messages that the first-class passenger sent to her acquaintance. The message vividly showed 
how irrational Cho’s deed particularly during the incident seemed to the first-class passenger 
(translated; “Cho, Hyun-ah,” 2015) : 
“Oh wow, this is insane. Plane has not even fully departed, and I noticed there is a crazy 
bitch behind me58”  
“Perhaps she is not given what she demanded to the flight attendant? She is keep 
screaming, and now it’s a total mess that chief purser has to come (to deal with this)59” 
(translated; 
“Oh wow. She is telling (him) to alight from the plane. (She is) telling the chief purser to 
alight from the plane with his belongings60”  
                                               
57 Popular messenger program in Korea 
58 Hangul: “미쳤나봐 어떡해. 비행기 출발 안 했는데 뒤에 미친 X 이야.” 
59 Hangul: “승무원한테 뭐 달라했는데 안줬나봐. 계속 소리지르고, 사무장 와서 완전 개난리다.” 
60 Hangul: “헐 내리래. 무조건 내리래. 사무장 짐 들고 내리래.” 
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“Wait, so we are seriously letting the plane stick back to the gate. It is really going back. 
(what the flight attendant / chief purser did) shouldn’t be too much of problem, at least in 
my view… Huh, I have never seen such circumstance like this before61”  
“Hell, how many people have to suffer just because of that woman?62”  
Specific quotes chosen by Kyunghyang Shinmun vividly illustrates the first-class passenger’s 
sense of surprise, frustrating tones and nuances via particular words (e.g. suffer), indicating 
no solicitude was present for her during the incident and therefore her demand-due-rights 
were infringed.  
Premium Chosun ’s legitimacy challenge approach via moral evaluation differed on the other 
hand; it quoted the first-class passenger during her media interview regarding how she felt 
about Korean Air’s action taken after the case, which clearly indicates failure of conducting 
any of the above mentioned four points (translated; “’Cho, Hyun-ah incident’,” 2014): 
When the first-class passenger asked: “just who is that person to make such mess?”, the 
flight attendant near her spared her breath and just said “it’s an internal issue63”  
“As I was angry by the fact that such intimidating atmosphere was formed, and the flight 
was returned during then just because of that (nut) services, I contacted Korean Air to 
remonstrate (regarding the poor service experienced). Then, this so-called managing 
director called me back, requesting ‘try not to interview with the media, and please tell 
them you have received a good apology, if interviewed ever while telling me that he will 
send me Korean Air calendar and miniature model aircraft (as a compensation to her 
inconvenience)’64”  
She further added: 
                                               
61 Hangul: “헐 진짜 (비행기를 게이트로) 붙인다. 정말 붙여. 내가 보기엔 그리 큰 잘못 아닌데. 
살다살다 이런 경우 처음 봐.” 
62 Hangul: “도대체 이 여자 때문에 도대체 몇 사람이 피해 보는 거야” 
63 Hangul: 박씨가 ‘어떤 분이시기에 저러는 거냐’고 묻자 승무원은 “회사 내부적인 일”이라며 
말을 아꼈다. 
64 Two sentences merged due to grammatical structure of Hangul: “고작 (땅콩) 서비스 때문에 비행기를 
돌리고 험악한 분위기를 조성했다는 것에 화가 나 대한항공에 항의했더니 이틀 뒤 상무라는 
사람이 전화를 걸어와 ‘인터뷰는 자제해주시고 하시더라도 사과를 잘 받았다고 이야기해달라’고 
하더라.” / 그는 “해당 임원이 대한항공 달력과 모형 항공기를 택배로 보내주겠다더라.” 
41 
 
“I was further enraged by the fact that (Cho and Korean Air) did not make proper apology 
to not only me, but to the rest of the passengers65” 
Views & News complemented Premium Chosun’s selection of quotes: 
The first-class passenger asked back, “even in my eyes (what Cho did during the incident) 
was unreasonably harsh; it’s just wrong. She could have pointed out (flaws) after the flight 
was done; (the plane) is not her office, is it?66” (translated; H. Kim, 2014) 
What Premium Chosun cited indicates that Cho seriously lacked self-control and discernment 
during the incident. Although not particularly emphasized in Kyunghyang Shinmun, Premium 
Chosun or Views & News’ articles, a lot of other media article texts have reinforced Cho’s 
role within Korean Air: the board member who is responsible for inflight services, which is 
considered quite ironic. This indirectly contributes to heavily crack down her legally-
concerned defense claiming that her action was righteously conducted as part of her task, 
rather than unjustifiable personal rant. The media text from Premium Chosun and Views & 
News also indicate that the first-class passenger’s right-to-know what exactly occurred during 
the incident that bugged her was intentionally masked, which clearly acts against her interest; 
she only got to know the whole story through the media articles. Poor customer service was 
notable as well, which fueled her anger. These aspects challenge sincerity of Korean Air and 
Cho’s apology, leading the media to speculate that perhaps their major concern is just their 
legal defense, rather than providing a reasonable value to its customers.  
The media texts emphasize that being the only non-Korean Air employee witness of the 
incident during the incident empowered the first-class passenger’s testimony morality wise; 
her claims demolished Korean Air’s communication strategy and personal traits of Cho as 
vice president, further amplifying an image of liar that Korean Air and Cho acquired from the 
incident. It is of no surprise that the official communicative reactions became targets of 
ridicule by its designated receivers; when even the directly involved customer do not view it 
                                               
65 Hangul: “나뿐만 아니라 당시 모든 승객들에게 제대로 된 사과를 하는 것 같지 않아 더 화가 
났다.” 
66 Hangul: “그는 “제가 봐도 너무 심했다는 생각이 들 정도였기 때문에 (조 부사장의 행동은) 
정말 백번 잘못한 것”이라며 “지적은 비행기에서 내려서도 할 수 있는 건데, 본인 사무실은 
아니지 않냐” 라고 반문했다.” 
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legitimate, who would? To the passenger, it was nothing but a mere contemptible excuse to 
attempt to obtain legitimacy. 
 
Earlier in this paper, a breach toward the first-class passenger’s right was discussed through 
use of rationalization, hence challenging pragmatic exchange legitimacy of Korean Air’ 
defense. Here in this moral evaluation section, the focus shifts; this section concentrates on 
legitimacy challenge based on how Korean Air’s actions adhered to the social 
expectation/values. Specifically, the central moral value system to be presented in this 
subsection is: ‘legally assured rights as an employee should not be hindered by an interest of 
a company’. That is to say, how the right of chief purser Park as an employee and as a 
human-being was interfered and thus, how this leads to a part of the media’s legitimacy 
challenge will be discussed67. The main data to be discussed is an interview conducted by 
Korean Broadcasting System (hereafter KBS) with one of the victims: the chief purser Park. 
The interview, through the voice of chief purser Park, allows KBS to being humanistic 
moralization legitimacy challenge, further empowering the challenge. 
Prior to the interview, however, a small contextual knowledge must be provided in order to 
fully comprehend why the media accused Korean Air has broken the main value system to be 
discussed in this section: hindering the victims’ rights as its employees. In short summary, 
following aspects need to be taken into account:  
1. There has been a strong public suspicion in the society that Korean Air, as a giant in 
the Korean aviation industry, would commit to destroy evidences no matter the cost 
2. Korean Air has notable influence over Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport 
(hereafter ‘MOLIT’) in various ways, indicating possible collusion (Oh, 2014; G. 
Kim, 2014; Park & Oh, 2014). 
3. This thereby creates a cloud of suspicion over sincerity of Korean Air’s stance 
regarding their apology toward the relevant victims of the case 
                                               
67 Howbeit, this complex issue also involves a certain degree of:  
1. mythopoesis and  
2. authorization element  
as there is a need to introduce a story to judge morality issues of the case, and to refer to legal aspects, which 
influence the legitimacy defense and challenge. 
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4. Notable share of suspicion turns out to be true, which contributed to damage Korean 
Air’s legitimacy defense as they face challenges based on both generic morality and 
specific moral value systems (“(Korean Air) attempted to destroy…”, 2014; H. Kim 
& G. Kim, 2014; “The prosecutors concluded that…”, 2015). 
Now let’s move on; based on this contextual information. in order to construct the story of 
the case from the victims’ perspective, KBS News conducted an interview with chief purser 
Park. The interview with the chief purser Park further confirmed the claims mentioned above, 
regarding how Park’s legal rights as an employee were violated, as Korean Air attempted to 
conceal evidences. The media texts from it showed that the victims – represented by Park, in 
this case – were not convinced by Korean Air’s apology and legitimacy defense attempt 
conducted so far; the discourse between the anchor and the chief purser Park has clearly 
expressed his distrust toward Korean Air as a company and MOLIT, as he has noticed Korean 
Air’s morally and legally questionable behavior: an attempt to conduct deliberate and 
systematic destruction of evidences under MOLIT’s direct/indirect assistance. 
From the interview media text provided by KBS News, certain phrases used by both the chief 
purser and the anchor are notable, as a humanistic discourse indicating breaching of the 
socially accepted value. Through both participants’ voice in their discourse, pragmatic 
exchange legitimacy challenge toward Korean Air is vividly shown as Park depicts the 
circumstances during then. The following first half of translated transcription of the interview 
between the anchor and Park shows how Park viewed the investigation was rigged and thus 
illegitimate due to Korean Air’s influence; certain relevant phrases that evoke questioning of 
morality toward Korean Air as it breaches Park’s right as human-being and as an employee 
are underlined from the below text: 
Anchor: “So, how were you noticed about the MOLIT investigation?” 
Park: “I was actually informed by the company, who requested me to show up to the 
office first.” 
Anchor: “That is to say, you did not get the notice call directly from MOLIT?” 
Park: “It did not happen.” 
Anchor: “Okay, so how were you informed?” 
Park: “I was told that I need to show up to the company and talk with the company 
personnel. So I was called to Koeran Air headquarter located in Gimpo, and during then I 
was ordered to speak contrary to the truth.” 
Anchor: “Ah, they gave you a guideline of what to say?” 
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Park: “Yes. They have already determined guideline for me of what to say during the 
investigation; it was like a scenario already written to legitimize ex-vice president Cho’s 
action. What they wanted from me, basically, is to accept their scenario and move on with 
it. I was not allowed to criticize ev-vice president’s fault, so I was forced to write an 
apology and explanation of the case. My superior typed it, while ordered by the director in 
charge of in-plane cabinet.” 
Anchor: “I see. So when you first attended MOLIT investigation and interrogation, how 
was the seat placement like?” 
Park: “If there is one thing I should say before anything, this would be it: all the cabin 
crews were gathered and given instruction on ‘guideline’ given by Korean Air.” 
Anchor: “You mean, (guideline on) answer to the all the potential questions?” 
Park: “Yes. ‘Answer it this way, that way’, was basically what I was told prior to the 
interrogation. In addition, the company gave the crew members further specific instruction, 
to prepare us answering the questions that we may not be well aware of. Only after then we 
moved to MOLIT office for the actual interrogation. However, as the investigation goes, 
there was extremely weird and suspicious procedural part that I could not understand, 
when considering this is supposed to be an investigation by the state institution. Rather 
than conducting an individual interrogation, the interrogation accompanied Korean Air 
board members, the then captain, and so on. It was more like company briefing rather than 
an interrogation to discover what really happened. 
Anchor: “Was the interrogation room isolated from the outside?” 
Park: “There was a door. However, like I told you while ago, I could hear what was 
spoken in the room when I stayed outside. 
Anchor: “That is to say…” 
Park: “When I testified, Korean Air personnel and board members waiting outside could 
all hear what I was saying. At that point, it made me think that this investigation cannot 
remain truthful to its intended purpose.” 
… 
Anchor: “So, the overall intention (of the company) was to address the incident as your 
fault… (rather than Cho’s)” 
Park: “I was forced to make false testimony that the incident occurred as a result of the 
then captain and I making a misjudgment.” 
Anchor: “Has the company requested you to modify or erase particular document or 
information regarding the case?” 
Park: “On 6th where I arrived, the director in charge ordered have not only me but to 
everyone involved – whether present there at then or not – to erase all the associated emails 
and initial reports.  
The underlined parts of the above media text both directly and indirectly challenges Korean 
Air’s legitimacy defense attempt, even though the media per se (KBS News) does not give 
any opinion about it; the anchor, with neutral tone, rather questions problematic actions taken 
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by Korean Air that potentially challenges Park’s legal rights. The actual delegitimization 
comes from Park’s responses, which contain negative and bitter tone (when reading the 
transcribed media text and hearing him from the interview). There are two notable aspects to 
pay attention to Park’s responses: first is his vivid description of the circumstance, which 
indicates how environment around him formed by MOLIT and Korean Air during then 
restricted him, thereby criticizing Korean Air’s apology as burying its head in the sand. For 
an instance, some of Park’s answers to the anchor in previous page are worth noting: 
Park: “… all the cabin crews were gathered and given instruction on ‘guideline’ given by 
Korean Air….  
…Rather than conducting an individual interrogation, the interrogation accompanied 
Korean Air board members, the then captain, and so on. It was more like company briefing 
rather than an interrogation to discover what really happened…. 
…, I could hear what was spoken in the room when I stayed outside… 
…the director in charge ordered have not only me but to everyone involved – whether 
present there at then or not – to erase all the associated emails and initial reports.” 
These particular statements act as evidences to indicate that there had been systematic and 
organized destruction of evidences, which simultaneously pressures Park from pursuing his 
rights as an employee, considering contextual condition that Park does not have much power 
to act against MOLIT/Korean Air personnel present during then.  
Second aspect to focus, which synergizes with the first aspect, is his lexical choices that are 
considerably negative, which indicates how Park felt his right has been illegally and 
immorally compromised. Examples of these include phrases such as: “forced to”, “cannot 
remain truthful”, “not allowed to” and so on. These further strengthens a delegitimization 
claim that the central value system argued in this section is, and thus defying Korean Air’s 
defending logic.   
 
Continuing from the previous subsection, it is notable that chief purser Park as a victim has 
also shown a sense of distrust toward Cho, Hyun-ah, due to her actions taken after the issue 
became publicized, as well. Hence here where normative personal legitimacy is discussed, 
the central value system to be addressed in this subsection is: ‘sincerity of an apology must be 
clear, with shift action.’ This subsection will contain the latter half of the translated 
transcription for the interview. Like the first half, the second half part of the interview 
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transcription contained some notable elements of authorization as part of its moralization-
based legitimacy challenge, as it makes a reference to common sense, norm, Korean culture 
and language to see how media delegitimate Korean Air and ex-vice president Cho’s attempt 
to defend legitimacy. 
In the latter half of the interview, Park mentioned that he received a slip note from ex-vice 
president Cho who visited his house when he was absent. Below is the part of the dialogue 
between the anchor and the chief purser; like how it was treated in the previous section, 
notable phrases are underlined: 
Anchor: “It was reported that when the case became a lot more problematic than 
anticipated, ex-vice president Cho visited your home to apologize, but found you absent 
and thus left a slip of note instead. Have you seen it?” 
Park: “She forcefully ‘apologized’ to me even though I have clearly stated that I am not 
willing to receive an insincere apology from the teeth outward, as far as I am aware of. 
Then today I found out the note that media has covered when I got home. The note fell as 
soon as I opened the door and…” 
Anchor: “Do you have the note with you?” 
Park: “Yes.” 
Anchor: “Do you mind if I can take a look at it?” 
Park: “I would like to show it to you anyway. It is really questionable… what on earth is 
this supposed to be a sincere apology – an apology from someone who claims to be 
prepared to apologize?” 
Anchor: “Let me take a look. So, in this handful size of a note, she wrote an apology with 
a pen:  
‘Dear chief purser Park. 
I was intending to visit you and apologize in person, but found you absent and thereby 
leaving this note. 
I am sorry.  
Cho, Hyun-ah’ 
So you must have seen this this morning?” 
Park: “I found that this morning, yes.” 
Anchor: “How did you feel when you received this note?” 
Park: “To be honest, I felt even worse – wretched. I had a slight bit of hope within me that 
she will sincerely apologize but the apology seems neither prepared with careful thoughts 
nor with sincerity that considers me into an account. It led me to think ‘ah, that person has 
not changed.’” 
47 
 
While KBS News per se did not make its legitimacy challenge apparent in this second half of 
the interview as well, it implies that there is an immediate issue with Cho’s action taken 
toward chief purser Park after the incident, which consequently leads to questioning of her 
personal aspect as the ex-vice president. Although Park, from the interview, did not directly 
pin-pointed and define ‘problematic’ discursive elements, his last words from the script 
implies that discursive elements was clearly one of the issues that frustrated him. From KBS 
interview the implied particular problem consists of lexical choice from Cho’s letter. Cho 
decided to use the phrase 미안하다 (I am sorry) rather than 죄송하다 (I apologize) in her 
slip note. A difference in implication of the two words is fairly big in Koran language and 
custom; according to the National Institute of the Korean Language68, the phrase 죄송하다 
shows greater degree of politeness when compared to 미안하다 (국립국어원, 2012). In 
addition, the former tends to be used when an apologizing person consider him/herself as a 
superior being or on superior position, whereas the latter tends to be used when considering 
the one receiving apology is on either equal or superior position. If Cho and Park were under 
friendship rather than a superior-subordinate relationship, saying ‘sorry’ could have worked 
as an apology. However, when taking their difference in age (Cho was born in 1974, Park was 
born in 1971) and difference in their status (one being vice president and the other being chief 
Purser back then) into an account, it would be hard to claim, at least to Park as he mentioned, 
what Cho did was a valid apology. Clarity of sincerity, let alone sincerity per se, was nowhere 
to be found, as her action was closer to that of superior treating her subordinate. 
Based on these aspects, it could be said that Cho’s hand-written slip note shows her denial of 
truly understanding the seriousness of the case, resulting in delayed apology. She has not 
given a proper consideration of how negatively forcing false witness then reluctantly 
apologizing would be judged and portrayed by the media and relevant stakeholders; it is 
suspected, by the eyes of Park and other audiences, that she attempted to make this apology 
not because she felt a sincere need to do so but rather because of massively huge negative 
public sentiment against her. Such view strengthens the view point that she attempted to 
breach socially accepted value within Korea. 
                                               
68 Hangul: 국립국어원 
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Along with the fact the she left a memo rather than rescheduling her visit for a proper face-to-
face apology, a grammatical mistake, for an instance – although KBS did not point it out even 
though it did not also fix the grammar when presenting it on the interview –, reflects how she 
gave a minimum concern about a need to apologize. In principal, it is a minor mistake; she 
originally wrote 드릴려고 in her memo when the correct one is 드리려고 (this literally 
means to give; in this case, it combines with the word 사과 to form a phrase ‘to apologize’). 
However, it may be regarded bad enough for the receiver of the message: Park to think of it 
as a sign that Cho did not give much concern about him and a need to apologize to him. This 
apology, with combination of all these aspects addressed so far, thus served the opposite 
effect; chief purser Park’s interview with KBS anchor demonstrates that Park is rather 
disappointed and distrust Cho even further, shown by his statement in the media text shown 
earlier in this subsection:  
“To be honest, I felt even wore – wretched. I had a slight bit of hope within me that she 
will sincerely apologize but the apology seems neither prepared with careful thoughts nor 
with sincerity that considers me into an account. It led me to think ‘ah, that person has not 
changed.’” 
Her qualification as a leader was thus questioned, which inevitably also led to challenge 
toward legitimacy of Korean Air’s defense attempt regarding the case. 
4.4 Legitimation through normalization 
Comparison to precedents is often a reasonable way to judge whether a matter within an 
organization is legitimately handled. Quoting Vaara,Tienari and Laurila, normalization, what 
aims to grant legitimacy by referring to a ‘normal or natural’ behavior, “seeks to render 
something legitimate by exemplarity” (Vaara,Tienari and Laurila, 2006). According to them, 
Van Leeuwen did not include normalization as its own CDA tool; rather considered it more as 
a sub-type of authorization and rationalization depending on the area discussed (‘conformity 
legitimation’ for sub-authorization, ‘fact-of-life rationalization’ or ‘naturalization’ for sub-
rationalization). However, in this paper, normalization will stand as its own CDA tool for the 
analysis of the case, as the media often made comparison of this case to the precedent to 
challenge Korean Air’ legitimacy defense attempt. 
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In this sub-section, how normalization as a tool, which is based on reference to exemplarity, 
has been used as a tool by the media to judge procedural legitimacy will be discussed. MK 
Securities69 in particular offers the cases of Firestone Tire and Rubber Company and Kolon 
Industry, which are two precedents with contrasting approach to solve their respective 
problems. 
MK Securities commenced with the similarly-concluded case; Firestone Tire and Rubber 
Company, recklessly underestimated an importance of timely communication showing its 
sincerity and will to solve the catastrophe it confronted. It consequently failed to lessen 
massive loss from its defective products, in short summary (D. Kim, 2016). The loss could 
have lessened if it decided to properly admit and make an apology on time; it decided to not, 
and decision to do so ensued a man-made disaster, heavily amplifying overall net loss. 
Korean Air’s case is almost no different, except the root of the problem was a lot more 
ridiculous (at least to the various stakeholders). 
On the other hand, MK Securities offered another case that is similarly initiated but 
concluded differently; it emphasized that how the case of Kolon Industry Inc. yielded a good 
result and thus act as a good guideline of how the matter should have been handled. It is 
remarkable how Kolon who faced tougher challenge – human casualty (the incident is called 
the collapse of Mauna Ocean Resort in Kyeong-Ju) – and yet yielded a better result in terms 
of legitimacy defense. When compared to how Korean Air worded its public apology, 
Kolon’s wording on its apology seems clearly a lot more reasonable; MK Securities 
nominated the first determining factor was the fact that Kolon clearly indicated who the 
apologizing principal agent is. Like how most of the media suggested, as shown in the early 
sub-sections of the result section, Kolon’s apology specifically mentioned that the Chairman 
Lee, Woong-yeol and all executive staffs apologize to the victims and their relatives, even 
though it did not directly cause the disaster. It therefore highlights this difference in approach 
between Kolon and Korean Air: 
                                               
69 A subsidiary of Maeil Kyungjae News 
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“This is a clear contrast when compared to how Korean Air merely mentioned the 
company per se as the apologizing principal agent for the crisis that initiated from Cho, 
Hyun-ah’s deviant behavior70” (translated; D. Kim, 2016) 
The second determining point mentioned was how responsive the public apology 
advertisement was announced. MK securities praised how Kolon responded rapidly, without 
any further calculation to lessen the possible opportunity cost of delayed apology, which was 
somewhat proven by subsequent event - the nut-rage return: 
“Now let’s compare the date of the incidents and the date of public apology for the both 
cases. On 19th of February, Kolon announced its public apology regarding the collapse 
incident that happened on 17th of February. Korean Air, on the other hand, issued the 
statement of stance to the media on 8th of December, and finally the public apology on 
16th on the newspapers for the nut-rage case that happened in 5th of December71” 
(translated; D. Kim, 2016). 
Last and perhaps the most important one, as stressed throughout the entire paper, is a 
sincerity of the apology. Of all aspects, Kolon’s action taken completely differed the most 
here when compared to Korean Air, it clearly stated not only the directly associated parties 
that it needs to apologize to but also those who are indirectly and/or potentially involved ones 
as well. Specifically, in Kolon’s public apology, Kolon apologized to all involved parties, in 
an order of (refer appendix 4): 
1. To every stakeholder (not specified however, it is just implied, as to whom is not 
mentioned. It is also written in bold and bigger letters) 
2. The students who lost their lives and their relatives 
3. The students who were injured and their relatives 
4. The public and the government authorities of Korea 
5. All above again 
Considering this, MK Securities mentioned: 
                                               
70 Hangul: “이는 조현아 부사장의 일탈행동에서 시작된 회항사건에 관한 신문 사과 광고문에 
‘대한항공’이라고만 적시한 것과는 확연하게 대비된다.” 
71 Hangul: 사건 발생 시점과 신문에 사과 광고를 낸 시점을 비교해보자. 코오롱은 2 월 17 일 밤에 
발생한 사건에 대해 2 월 19 일자 조간신문 1 면에 일제히 사과 광고를 게재했다. 대한항공은 
12 월 5 일 발생한 사건에 대해 12 월 8 일 밤 11 시에야 비로소 언론사에 첫 공식 사과 
보도자료를 배포했으며 신문에는 12 월 16 일에야 사과 광고를 냈다. 
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“Kolon specifically stated each victims of the collapse incident, and apologized four times. 
(omitted) … Kolon was very clear expressing who, to whom, and why it is apologizing. 
Many who have read the public apology must have felt that Kolon’s Chairman Lee, 
Woong-yeol and all executive staffs are sincerely apologizing72” (translated; D. Kim, 
2016). 
Conversely, throughout the whole apology advertisement, Korean Air did not mention any of 
the following relevant stakeholders at all: 
1. The chief purser Park, who was eventually dropped off from the aircraft 
2. The female flight attendant, who faced massive insults from Cho 
3. The other first-class passenger, who had her right to have a quiet time during the 
service heavily interrupted 
4. Entire passengers who unwilling had to sacrifice their time for not-so-funny reason,  
5. The work-force who had to face additional stress from unreasonable event at all.  
Rather, the apology advertisement from Korean Air apologized to unspecified public, as if 
that is the Maginot Line that it can compromise to. This non-committal apology resulted in a 
worse-off situation for Korean Air, unlike how a precedent has been handled by Kolon. 
Contrary to Korean Air’s result, Kolon’s case was successful for Kolon, managing to lower 
down public anger. Both companies made their apologies to the public, but the difference in 
their approach determined effectiveness of their attempt. 
Once again, it must be stressed that the crucial difference that led Kolon’s apology to be 
successful, apart from Kolon’s timely action, is clear mentioning of who is apologizing to 
whom for what reason. Kolon was able to achieve its intended normative consequential 
legitimacy – they have done what deemed to be ‘right’ actions, making themselves exemplary 
precedent for others. As stressed by what was claimed in MK Securities’ article, when 
compared to the official apology from Korean Air, the audience can notice commitment from 
that of Kolon’s, which is one of the necessities for a successful apology. To audience, what 
Kolon has done implies that the company is taking the matter seriously, and adequately 
identified what needs to be done. 
                                               
72 Hangul: “코오롱은 사죄드리는 대상을 지명하면서 4 번씩 사죄했다. (중략) … 이 사과문을 접한 
많은 사람들은 이웅열 회장과 코오롱그룹 임직원들이 진심으로 사죄하고 있다는 것을 느꼈을 
것이다.” 
52 
 
4.5 Legitimation through mythopoesis 
To explain whether a task has been done in a rightful manner inevitably involves an act of 
narration; elaboration of story offers evidences of behavior that are regarded socially 
preferential, acceptable or perhaps appropriate. According to Van Leeuwen and Wodak’s 
1999 work, mythopoesis, interchangeably used as narrativization, is defined as legitimacy 
obtaining tool (or process) which involves use of narratives and storytelling, connecting 
actions in question to the past or to the future. Unfortunately, however, there are no solid 
articles that may be suited for this section solely; most of them contained elements of other  
  
53 
 
5 Discussion 
5.1 Prevalence of normative media texts and thus normative legitimacy challenges 
Normative media texts were most prevalent ones to be provided by the Korean media, which 
consequentially led this paper to have six out of eight subsections from the findings to deal 
with normative legitimacy challenges. Similar to the case that Olga Lavrusheva discovered in 
her master’s thesis paper, citing previous studies of Hardy et al. (2000), Vaara et al. (2006) 
and Vaara and Monin (2010), such result is rather not surprising, considering how many 
politically challenging behaviors were conducted during the incident, and how they also 
initiated all other controversies, whether they are purely associated with moral responsibility 
or legal responsibility. This imbalance among the strategic media text for the case is believed 
to signify that the societal interest of the case – enragement, to be more exact – was more 
concerned with how Korean Air breached the social agreements regarding human rights. 
Therefore, the following subsections will discuss this phenomenon to discuss the case in 
bigger context. 
 
To see why normative legitimacy challenges have been dominant, it would be important to 
think of interrelated influential factors that currently challenge corporate culture within 
Korea: Chaebol, ‘Gapjil’, economic democracy and potentially demand for organizational 
justice. As mentioned earlier in the paper, changes in economic and societal environments in 
Korea has been bringing corresponding demand for a change in corporate culture. This 
tendency has been greater among the younger generation of Korean society, who found 
current corporate culture frustrating and thus desire a greater degree of organizational justice 
and economic democracy, as Cho et al. (2014) addressed. Park revealing the case despite 
pressure from Korean Air, the media covering the incident seriously by questioning morality 
of Korean Air and the owner family member and the massive public backlash reflects such 
phenomenon. 
The cause of whole incident can be summarized as recently-created Korean term introduced 
earlier: Gapjil, which The New York Times translated it as “the abuse of underlings and 
subcontractors by executives who behave like feudal lords” (Choe, 2018). Cho’s irrational 
behavior during then incident was commonly regarded as Gapjil by the media, which some 
media linked her behavior as an evident result of Korean Air’s corporate culture allowing 
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Chaebol the owner family members to have unstoppable power within the organization (M, 
Kim. 2015). Various media (Gobal News, The PR and many others), at least in their editorial 
texts, agreed that Gapjil depicts one of the key roots of this case: broken power balance 
problem between the owner family members and the rest of the workforce occurring from the 
peculiar ‘Chaebol’ environment, which leads to Korean Air’s particularly oppressing, and 
non-communicative corporate culture (Kang, 2015; Ahn, 2015).  
 
In the case of Korean Air and particularly nut-rage incident, the principal agents of 
Gapjil were the owner family members, who have strong influence within the organization. 
Anachronistic nepotism has been ingrained deep within Korean Air, similar to many other 
existing Chaebols. However, the side effect of nepotism has been a lot more apparent in 
Korean Air, supported by its relatively higher rate of “Gapjil” related scandals when 
compared to others. 
As the media de-legitimized the communication approaches that Korean Air adopted to 
obtain discursive legitimacy for the case, some of them also questioned effectiveness and 
meaningfulness of the measures taken by Korean Air. Notably Gobal News, Chosun Biz and 
Huffington Post KR shared similar opinions via both direct and implied messages within their 
media text in this regard; their common argument was that the unique ‘Chaebol factor’ of 
Korean Air will nullify the measures taken regardless of Korean Air PR team’s effort (You, 
2014; D. Kang, 2014; S. Kang, 2014):  
1. Cho family exercising excessive amount of power within Korean Air, leading no 
employee dare to speak ‘against’ them even if it clearly benefits Korean Air (e.g. 
suggesting chainman Cho, Yang-ho to take stronger measures after the nut-rage 
incident / passive apology, like the FO1) 
2. There is no internal group or method within Korean Air to hold the owner family in 
check, resulting in employees equating the owner family members to Korean Air as 
company per se.   
3. The owner family continually producing ‘Gapjil’ related headline risks, indicating no 
proper and sincere signs of self-reflection to appeal to the general public 
As pointed by Economic Review in its 2016 article, this is of no surprise to many individuals; 
many individuals who previously and current work at Korean Air mentioned that the biggest 
drawback of Korean Air is ‘owner (family) risk’ (Yeo, 2016). The ‘owner risk’ problems 
addressed above have not been improved even after the incident, despite the chairman of 
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Hanjin group Cho, Yang-ho’s promise to improve Korean Air’s corporate culture after the 
incident. When more ‘Gapjil’ related incidents got publicized in 2018, internal workforce, 
frustrated by the owner family’s continuing feudal lord behavior, started to collect not only 
Gapjil-related evidences but also other illegal activities that Korean Air and its parent-
company Hanjin group committed under the owner family’s order.  
This irony of the internal stakeholders of the company attacking their belonging company 
rather than supporting it, as it failed to treat them righteously, shows how Korean Air, due to 
its owner family, failed to defend its legitimacy in recent cases (D. Kim, 2018). Based on 
evidences collected, number of government organizations: the police, prosecution, Korean 
Customs Service, MOLIT, Ministry of Employment and Labor(MOEL) and Fair Trade 
Commission (FTC) targeted Korean Air for massive inspections (including tax inspection). 
Adding insult to injury, in May 4th of 2018, the Korean Air workforce, subcontractors and 
citizens also began protesting to condemn the owner family, indicating no supporting public 
sentiment against the government inspections (K. Kang, 2018). Needless to say, the media 
started to cover those cases and the associated stakeholders’ actions, which eventually ended 
up with crushing Korean Air’s remaining legitimacy defense – if there is any left – for all 
incidents including the nut-rage case from 2014. Korean Air’s repeated mistakes clearly acted 
as headline risks, leading the media and the general public to wonder whether Korean Air and 
the owner family truly learned or acknowledged what must be truly done. This ultimately 
leave to one question: can the essential problem be fixed via communication tools solely? 
5.2 Less occurring delegitimization strategy and tools  
 
As discussed in the section 5.1, the media’s focus of the delegitimization of the case shift has 
been primarily on normative legitimacy challenges. Pragmatic legitimacy based 
delegitimization covered impactful topic of the first-class passenger and chief purser Park’s 
rights being severely compromised. While these are strong issues to argue per se, the media, 
however, rather used them to argue more of normative legitimacy issues, as they perceived 
these pragmatic legitimacy issues to be the result of normative ones, turning the pragmatic 
ones into more of supplementary issues For an instance, journalists who wrote the strategic 
media text with pragmatic legitimacy-based delegitimization arguments ultimately linked 
those to Gapjil issues, which is more associated with normative legitimacy challenges.  
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In this paper, there was no strategic media text example that particularly focused on cognitive 
legitimacy or used mythopoesis as main legitimacy tool. First and rather obvious reason that 
comes to my mind is prevalence of normative legitimacy elements, which leads the media to 
end up primarily focusing on those. The nut-rage case per se did not trigger questioning 
toward Korean Air’s existence; while many aspects were challenged, both comprehensibility 
and taken-for-grantedness elements of Korean Air were not challenged. Arguments toward 
those elements, interestingly however, were brought to light later on, when more Gapjil 
related incidents and the owner family’s acts of illegality start to expose to the public in 2018. 
That is to say, the nut-rage case incident may definitely have contributed to evoke the media’s 
cognitive legitimacy delegitimization eventually in later years; it just was not direct enough 
to lead to production of strategic media text during 2014. 
As mentioned in the findings section, mythopoesis suffered from majorly from other 
elements having considerable amount of narrative building, which made it hard for 
mythopoesis to have its stand-alone status as strategic media text. Furthermore, by its nature, 
mythopoesis based strategic media text tends to be lengthier, as ‘story’ needs to be 
established. Most of the textual materials available: the strategic media texts, however, were 
not deemed lengthy enough to build story-based arguments. The best of lengthy ones found 
focusing on the nut-rage incident were either non-media text (e.g. book) or focused on non-
legitimacy (e.g. crisis management as main topic and legitimacy as subcategory at best) topic.  
Another problem, interrelated with the previous problem in some extent, is how scattered 
strategic media texts have been. Most of them seem to focus on fragments of the incident or 
certain argument deeply, rather than forming a whole story. This tendency of strategic media 
texts from Korean media led the data to be noticeably ‘opportunistic,’ in a way. Similar 
conclusion to that explaining the lack of cognitive legitimacy is driven: the media focused on 
mythopoesis element more when they covered the protest in May 4th , 2018, as perhaps 
mythopoesis is easier to develop when linking chains of events that result in legitimacy 
challenge.  
5.3 Discrepancy between Korean Air’s expectations and actual results 
Along with the fact that normative legitimacy challenges have been the most challenged 
aspects by the media, one of the clear discoveries from the findings section was a 
considerably big gap between what Korean Air thought of legitimate responses toward the 
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case and what the society, represented by the media in this case, thought of. The end results 
of Korean Air’s measures were far from their goals; they ended up infuriating designated 
audiences more; almost none of their measures taken was regarded appropriate. The 
following subsections are to discuss potential causes of such happening. 
 
This nut-rage case is not the only ‘Gapjil’ case that occurred by the owner family members. 
Experiences prior to this incident should have given Korean Air what proper steps need to be 
considered; it would be, thereby, fair to expect Korean Air has learned what must be done to 
minimize public backlash. The question then is how such recognition gap occurred 
nonetheless?  
One potential likely assumption based on the responses taken by the Korean Air is that the 
owner family members and board members of Korean Air treated the case somewhat lightly, 
dealing the incident with ‘Et hoc transibit / This, too, shall pass away’ mindset. As the media 
pointed out earlier, it seems that the owner family didn’t allocate enough attention and 
resources in obtaining legitimacy to turn the game around. Instead of adopting measures 
similar to those in precedent case involving Kolon, Korean Air seemed more interested to 
take ‘easier’ method: how Korean Air itself dealt previously. Korean Air and the owner 
family apologized few times – move aside whether the receiving audiences considered their 
attempt as apologies –and remained silent until the case is buried by other issues. This same 
repertoire occurred for the previous cases; it may be plausible to claim that the top executives 
considered their choice of response to the case to be a safe call. Only when backfire became 
noticeably uncontrollable, far beyond their expectation, they started to act more seriously –
which was quite late by then. While the economic, societal and importantly legitimacy 
environment alters along with time, Korean Air decided to maintain their old strategy, only 
yielding losses.  
 
Another example that shows Korean Air’s dangerously complacent attitude towards 
conducting countermeasures is its poor decision toward the compensation for victims. In this 
particular section, the main discussion aspect is on pragmatic legitimacy aspects. It is quite 
interesting how Korean Air assumed the victims who have their rights challenged will remain 
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silent with, objectively-speaking, ridiculous apology and reward proposals. To the media, 
such proposals were destined to fail, just at a glance.  
In terms of legitimacy defense, even the media showed certain degree of incredulousness 
since Korean Air’s countermeasures were very questionable, self-righteous in a way and thus 
amateurish; it’s like as if Korean Air is freely offering its weak spots to the media to attack. 
Referring to section 4.3, both the first-class passenger during then incident and the chief 
purser Park claimed they were dumbfounded by Korean Air’s offers. What Korean Air was 
truly intending may not be known, but one clear matter is that its decision was clearly an 
exemplary countermeasure to not follow.  
  
59 
 
6 Conclusion 
This final section consists of four subsections. In the first subsection, the research findings 
are summarized in the light of the research question. Practical implications are dealt in the 
second subsection. Then, the limitations of the study are discussed in the third section. Last, 
suggestions for future research will be addressed. 
6.1 Research summary 
In this subsection, the key results of the research for this paper are to be shown. Primarily, the 
aim of this paper was to gain an understanding of how corporate legitimacy defense attempt 
is analyzed and critiqued by the media, with specific context of Korean conglomerate: 
Chaebol, represented by Korean Air in this case. The study was motivated by personal 
concern toward constantly occurring communication and legitimacy disasters by Chaebols 
within Korea. While literatures regarding legitimacy issues of Chaebols’ problematic 
incidents exist mainly in Korean, those particularly discuss with specific recent case example 
or those in English are relatively rarer to discover; hence, such circumstance motivated me to 
conduct this MSc thesis. 
The main research question, to assist achieving the aim, was to identify what delegitimization 
strategies were adopted by the media to challenge Korean Air’s response toward the ‘nut-
rage’ incident. To support answering the main research question of the paper, this paper 
decided to draw upon Suchman (1999) and Scott et al. (2000)’s work when categorizing 
types of legitimacy to sort strategic media text data. Then, this paper also adopted Van 
Leewen and Wodak’s work in 1999 and Vaara and Tienari’s work in 2008 regarding critical 
discourse analysis (CDA) to further specify what strategic tools (authorization, 
rationalization, moral evaluation, mythopoesis and normalization) were selected to further 
elaborate on findings. The following table on the next page summarizes it: 
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Table 2: Summary of delegitimization strategies used by the media for the nut-rage 
incident 
The analysis covered the articles from various Korean media and Korean Air’s corporate 
defensive accounts as the former’s complementary texts since the incident. The analysis of 
strategic media text revealed most occurring de-legitimization strategies conducted by the 
media; the results juxtapose with theoretical models offered by van Leeuwen and Wodak 
(1999), Vaara et al. (2006) and Vaara and Tienari (2008). The result of the findings revealed 
that the normative legitimacy was the primary focus of the media, with a small proportion of 
pragmatic challenges; however. no cognitive legitimacy challenges were identified. While the 
most aspects of CDA strategies were considered by the media, there seems to be greater focus 
on authorization and moral evaluation aspects, while very few contained mythopoesis 
element (and therefore not used in this paper). Based on these findings, discussion of: 
1) why normative legitimacy texts and challenges were prevalent,  
2) why discrepancy between Korean Air’s expectation and results occurred and  
3) why certain delegitimization strategies and tools occurred less 
Strategy type Purpose Strategies and 
characteristics 
Example 
Authorization Delegitimization 
conducted by making a 
reference to 
indisputable authority.  
Criticism toward Cho’s 
personal traits and the 
procedural aspects of 
Korean Air’s 
countermeasures based on 
relevant Korean laws 
Appendices 5, 6, 
and 7 
Rationalization Delegitimization 
conducted by referring 
to utility gained from 
business 
knowledge/environment 
Criticism on ‘what’ and 
‘how’ aspects of Korean 
Air’s initial countermeasure 
in comparison to business 
norm 
Appendix 1  
three “A” element 
insisted in Jugan 
Donga 
Moral 
evaluation 
Delegitimization 
conducted by 
emphasizing specific 
moral values 
Criticism based on three 
specific value systems 
Prosecutor’s 
evidences 
mentioned in the 
media. 
Interview with the 
chief purser Park 
Normalization Delegitimization 
conducted by 
comparing to 
precedents 
Criticism based on 
comparison of Korean Air’s 
countermeasures to how 
two contrasting precedents 
have dealt with crisis. 
Appendix 4 
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were conducted. Based on the findings and discussion, it is clear that the media deemed 
Korean Air’s responses were undoubtable failure. 
I would argue that this paper makes certain contribution to organization and communication 
studies, leaving number of implications to be noted. First of all, this thesis paper emphasizes 
the importance of conducting timely, sincere and proper discursive legitimacy when 
catastrophic incident occurs. Without a doubt, legitimacy is regarded as a key issue for 
multinational corporations (MNCs) as claimed by Geppert (2003) and Kostova and Zaheer 
(1999). As most Chaebols are MNCs, there is more than enough reasons for them to be 
concerned about it; complex organizations like Chaebols are more likely vulnerable whether 
internally or externally – this incident has demonstrated it quite well. The approach and 
discussion of findings of this paper gave a concern to the three types of complexity needed 
when attempting to obtain legitimacy (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999): 
1. the legitimating environment  
2. the organization 
3. the process of legitimation 
The findings section of the paper elaborate on what process of legitimation was taken by 
Korean Air and how it consequently faced challenges by the media, while the discussion of 
findings elaborates on how contextual information: the specific legitimating environment of 
Korea (Chaebol) and the organization (Korean Air) synergizes to result in delegitimization. 
Second, this paper focuses on media as a “sensemaking and legitimation arena,” supporting 
the idea suggested by Vaara et al. (2006). In contemporary society, the media, especially via 
digital means, rapidly spreads their messages to huge number of audiences, when compared 
to traditional means of distribution. The media focused on different aspects of 
delegitimization and sensemaking, notably “production, transmission, and consumption 
processes” of those (Vaara et al., 2006). As stressed throughout the paper, the media played 
gigantic role in determining the flow of delegitimization the specific organizational incident: 
the nut-rage case. The media, as a result, took the initiative in this legitimacy defense 
/challenge war; Korean Air was dragged around by the media, not being able to assert its 
claims strongly and convincingly enough against delegitimization in almost every single 
aspect. Its defensive corporate accounts were by no means as effective as delegitimization 
texts from the media; they, rather, became subject of further criticism. 
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6.2 Practical implications 
The practical implication from the findings of this paper can be very local-contextual; the 
ultimate lesson the case and this paper left was to not equate owner family and the company. 
While nepotism deep within Korean Air is indeed a bigger problem, as it has been resulting in 
owner family members on executive positions who continuously create headline risks, it 
could start with a suggestion to urge Chaebols to apply same standard and rules to their 
owner family members – do not make them seem as if they are on top of the corporate rules 
and standards. The whole legitimacy issues of this case all rooted from a simple, but 
commonly agreed by different stakeholders and the media, cause: the owner family within the 
company being overly powerful, untouched and unchallenged. The fact that ex-vice president 
Cho returned the airplane for very personal and irrational reason acts against interest of 
stakeholders in multiple levels. An article from Ohmynews has left straightforward comment, 
questioning whether the nut problem “was truly sensitive enough to consume 250 other 
people’s precious time?73” (J. Kim, 2014). A lack of restraining force toward them within 
Korean Air was indeed a major issue; the following statement sums it up:  
“A prime example of what happens when a person with terrible personality obtains high 
position within an organization, with absolutely no restraining force74.75” 
“A nut goes nuts over nuts. Who would have guessed.”76  
Another practical implication to consider is a need to show consistency when conveying 
apology message to the target audience. This implication is somewhat interrelated with the 
first implication for this particular case, as often the owner family members become obstacle 
                                               
73 “땅콩 문제가 250 명의 시간을 점유할 만큼 민감한 문제였나)” 
74 Hangul:조직 내에서 인격이 나쁜 사람이 높은 지위를 아무런 견제 없이 가지면 어떻게 
되는지를 보여준 사례 
75 This phrase is adopted from a survey respondent, who revealed himself as a Korean passport holding 25 
years-old, currently employed male. Survey was initially planned as part of data set, but it was decided to not 
include it at the final stage of this paper. 
76 Adopted from Namuwiki (in Korean; 
https://namu.wiki/w/%EB%82%98%EB%AC%B4%EC%9C%84%ED%82%A4:%EB%8C%80%EB%AC%B
8). This was a comment from Wall Street Journal online news, with archived evidence saved separately on 
Namuwiki, as the original link for this specific comment is no longer available: 
(https://attachment.namuwikiusercontent.com/%EB%8C%80%ED%95%9C%ED%95%AD%EA%B3%B5%2
0KE%20086%ED%8E%B8%20%EC%9D%B4%EB%A5%99%EC%A7%80%EC%97%B0%20%EC%82%A
C%EA%B1%B4__nutsX3.jpg)  
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to achieve this. Both internal and external communication conducted by Korean Air PR team 
to seek legitimacy after the incident were not functioning anywhere near how they were 
intended. The owner family acted contrary to how Korean Air as company has claimed what 
actions it would take to deal with the case, as mentioned throughout the paper. Until 2018’s 
protest, the workforce during the then incident feared retaliation if they were to point out her 
illegitimate (and illegal) behaviors, and the top management including her father, CEO, 
focused more on covering up legitimacy of her actions and burying the case as silently as 
possible. Protest, government inspection, and the media coverages of the protest and past 
incidents are, in a way, retributive justice taking a place. The butterfly effect of 
delegitimization was consequential; loss of credibility brought huge price to pay for Korean 
Air, in the end. 
Third, this paper contributes to extend our knowledge regarding Korea’s contemporary social 
phenomena against one of the negative aspects of its corporate culture: Gapjil. Although this 
phenomenon is not only exclusive to Korea, similar issues in other nations have not been as 
internationally publicized as the cases in Korea. Although the notion of Gapjil would 
generally be discussed more with academic papers involving risk management, I believe this 
paper still enhances our understanding of such phenomena and how the media crucially 
influences different stakeholders’ sensemaking of it. The knowledge gained from here could 
potentially be applicable to other nation with similar history of economic growth.  
6.3 Limitations of the study 
As many papers do, this paper has its own limitations to consider as well. First to consider is 
that this thesis paper was based on qualitative approach; that is to say, there was no 
numeral/statistical analysis to follow up for majority of the findings, other than one slight 
usage in the rationalization section. Although a combination of different approaches 
(statistics, survey, and so on) was initially planned, the idea was wiped out; considering the 
nature of the work done in this paper, quantitative method, except perhaps in a very limited 
manner, would have been very likely unsuitable, resulting in divergence or potentially 
distortion of topic. 
Another limitation to consider is rather narrow scope of focus for the paper: one 
academically, one practically. The narrow scope of focus in terms of academic concern is use 
of delegitimization strategy framework based on van Leeuwen and Wodak (1999) and Vaara 
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et al. (2006)’s work. The categorization of legitimacy strategies allows more focused analysis 
but at a cost of missing other potential strategies which may not have been identified yet. The 
practical side of narrow scope of focus is that this particular paper focuses on one incident: 
the nut-rage case. As stressed in practical implication, the case is very local-contextually 
specific to Korean Chaebol; even among various Chaebols, this would be somewhat 
exceptional. Peculiarity of Korean Air owner family’s repeated Gapjil behaviors for an 
instance is an outstanding example that represents this context-heavy, narrow and rare case. 
Thus, the biggest consequential concern, particularly academic purpose wise, is a problem of 
generalizing results and interpretation of the findings, despite their potential viability.  
The analysis of findings eventually discussed the notion of ‘Gapjil’ to elaborate how the 
media de-legitimized Korean Air’s measures taken. Although equivalent notions existed 
earlier, this notion has been established and solidified rather recently, resulting in relatively 
lower number of academic study both in Korean, let alone in English. Further in-depth 
academic representation of Gapjil as a notion could have helped both this paper and future 
research with similar subjects. 
6.4 Suggestions for future research 
This paper focused strategic aspects of the media text, mainly in terms of delegitimization; 
eventually, corporate defense account became complementary resources to support the 
strategic media text. I believe, however, future studies involving similar case or topic can also 
utilize legitimization tactics conducted by defensive corporate accounts. Future research can 
be conducted via sole use of defensive corporate accounts or perhaps even comparison of 
both legitimization and delegitimization tactics by respective sides, which I would imagine it 
can potentially demonstrate bigger picture to understand both legitimization and 
delegitimization process.  
Another suggestion is to consider data dealing with multimodal communication means, not 
limiting strategic data options to solely media texts. Although multimodality means more 
variables to consider, complicating analysis and potentially distorting cause-and-effects, it 
can also provide more interesting findings of implications of strategic media texts. More and 
more media tend to use visual and audio communications to strengthen their delegitimization 
arguments, which can then bring greater room for micro-level rhetorical approach, which this 
paper was not able to provide much. As an example of micro level rhetorical approach, in-
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depth linguistic analysis of strategic media text – namely analysis of lexical choices, overall 
tone, poses, visual cue and so on – could have been beneficial to gain greater extent of 
knowledge associated with the media’s delegitimization strategies in the incidents like this, 
for an instance.   
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Appendix 
Appendix 1: Korean Air’s ‘statement of stance’ released to the media (2014 December 
8th; translation added in the bracket right to the original statement)77  
 ‘1. 승객분들께 불편을 끼쳐드려 사과 드립니다. (We would like to apologize for the 
passengers of the inconvenience that we caused) 
○ 비상 상황이 아니었음에도 불구하고 항공기가 다시 제자리로 돌아와 승무원을 
하기시킨 점은 지나친 행동이었으며, 이로 인해 승객 분들께 불편을 끼쳐드려 
사과드립니다 ((We Korean Air)78 apologizes to our passengers for the inconvenience 
caused by the return of the aircraft, as it was an immoderation, even though the circumstance 
was not an emergency). 
○ 당시 항공기는 탑승교로부터 10 미터도 이동하지 않은 상태로, 항공기 안전에는 
문제가 없었습니다 (At that particular moment, the aircraft has moved less than 10 meters 
from the boarding bridge, and thus not negatively influencing aircraft safety.) 
2. 대한항공 임원들은 항공기 탑승 시 기내 서비스와 안전에 대한 점검의 의무가 
있습니다. ((The executives of Korean Air are responsible to inspect in-flight services 
and security concerns when they are on the flight) 
○ 사무장을 하기시킨 이유는 최고 서비스와 안전을 추구해야 할 사무장이 (The 
reason why we ejected our cabin crew chief, who is supposed to pursue best service and 
security, is: )  
                                               
77 Retrieved from: The Huffington Post Korea, whom cited their original source as Joongang Ilbo; 
http://www.huffingtonpost.kr/2014/12/08/story_n_6287626.html 
78 In original Korean, there was no subject at all, as a part of evasive language tactics. 
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1)담당 부사장의 지적에도 불구하고 규정과 절차를 무시했다는 점 (1. He has 
ignored the Korean Air regulation and associated procedures, despite the the the ex-vice 
president Cho’s warning) 
2) 매뉴얼조차 제대로 사용하지 못하고 변명과 거짓으로 적당히 둘러댔다는 점을 
들어 조 부사장이 사무장의 자질을 문제 삼았고, 기장이 하기 조치한 것입니다. 
(2. He concocted an excuse for violating Korean Air manual, let alone not being able to 
properly utilize it; the the ex-vice president Cho has problematized his behavior and 
qualification, and thus resulted in aircraft captain to eject Park from the plane 
○ 대한항공 전 임원들은 항공기 탑승 시 기내 서비스와 안전에 대한 점검 의무가 
있습니다. 조현아 부사장은 기내 서비스와 기내식을 책임지고 있는 임원으로서 
문제 제기 및 지적은 당연한 일입니다. (The executives of Korean Air are responsible to 
inspect in-flight services and security concerns when they are on the flight. It is natural and 
reasonable for the the ex-vice president Cho Hyun-ah, an executive who is responsible for 
inflight services and meals, to point out and problematize seemingly troublesome conducts. 
3.철저한 교육을 통해 서비스 질을 높이겠습니다. (We will make sure to raise the 
quality of our service via thorough training.) 
○ 대한항공은 이번 일을 계기로 승무원 교육을 더욱 강화해 대 고객 서비스 및 
안전 제고에 만전을 기하겠습니다. (We, Korean Air, will make sure to improve our 
customer service and safety concerns via thorough training of our flight attendants.) 
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Appendix 2 Public apology and question-and-answer from Cho Yang-ho, the chairman 
of Korean Air and Hanjin group at press conference. 
Adopted from Hankyoreh (M. Kim, 2014)79: 
제 여식의 어리석은 행동으로 큰 물의를 일으킨 데 대해 진심으로 사죄 드립니다 
/ I would like to sincerely apologize for my daughter’s foolish misbehavior that caused 
massive public criticism. 
대한항공 회장으로서, 또한 조현아의 애비로서 국민 여러분의 너그러운 용서를 
다시 한번 바랍니다. 저를 나무라주십시오. 저의 잘못입니다. / As the chairman of 
Korean Air, and also as a father of Cho, Hyun-ah, I would like to ask for the public’s 
generous forgiveness. Scold me rather; it is my fault. 
국토부와 검찰의 조사 결과와 상관 없이 조현아를 대한항공 부사장직은 물론 
계열사 등기이사와 계열사 대표 등 그룹내 모든 자리에서 물러나도록 
하겠습니다. / Regardless of investigation results from the prosecution and Ministry of Land, 
Infrastructure, and Transport, Cho, Hyun-ah will be resigned from her current positions: 
affiliate representative, affiliate director of the board and needless to say, Korean Air vice-
president. 
다시 한번 사죄의 말씀을 드리며, 국민 여러분의 용서를 구합니다. / Once again, I 
apologize, and beg your pardon. 
 
Question-and-answer: 
- 사과가 늦어진 이유는 뭡니까? / - Why has apology been delayed so long? 
“변명하지 않겠습니다. 죄송합니다” / “I will not give excuse about that. I apologize.” 
                                               
79 Also, take a look at video uploaded by the Kyunghyang TV, associated with a report from Kyunghyang news; 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lf0GOtgO1fU 
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- 이번 사건이 왜 일어났다고 보십니까? / - What is your view on why this incident 
occurred? 
“제가 교육을 잘못시킨 것 같아 죄송합니다” / “I apologize for that I have raised her 
wrong.” 
- 조 전 부사장이 다시 복귀합니까? / - Will the ex-vice president Cho return to her 
work? 
“경영 복귀는 아직 생각해 본 적이 없습니다” / “I have not thought about whether she 
will be back for the management.” 
- 고객서비스 매뉴얼을 개선할 계획은 없습니까? / - Do you intend to modify current 
customer service manual? 
“고객서비스 매뉴얼은 지금껏 잘못된 게 없다고 생각하나 잘못된 게 있다면 
고쳐나가겠습니다.” / “I do not think there is anything wrong with the current manual so far, 
but will do so if there is anything wrong with it.” 
- 평창동계올림픽 조직위원장직을 계속 맡으실 건가요? / - Will you continue to be in 
charge of the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics, as a chairperson? 
“조직위원장 자리는 공적인 자리인 만큼 혼자 결정할 수 없는 상황이어서 
올림픽에 도움에 방향으로 결정하겠습니다.” / “As the position of the chairperson is 
rather public, I cannot determine that in my own. I will coordinate the matter in a way 
beneficial to the Winter Olympics.” 
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Appendix 3: Korean Air’s apology advertisement in the major news80 (2014 December 
16th; translation below the photo) 
 
Translation, following original’s format:  
(We Korean Air) feel keenly any word of apology is not sufficient at this 
point. 
Recent incidents of Korean Air have failed people with indescribable disappointment 
(We) have affronted you who have been showing great love (toward us). 
(we are) aware that any word of apology is not sufficient. 
Hence so, 
(we) will keep your reprimand and reproof deep in our heart. 
(We) will try our best to turn over a leaf and become a beloved and trustworthy Korean Air 
once again 
                                               
80 Photo adopted from: Chosun Biz (http://biz.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2014/12/16/2014121603104.html)  
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(We) will become new Korean Air 
Korean Air 
  
81 
 
Appendix 4: Kolon Industry Inc’s public apology distributed to Korean media 
Jpg version: 
http://menu.mt.co.kr/moneyweek/thumb/2014/02/18/06/2014021808538064847_1.jpg 
엎드려 사죄 드립니다. / (We) bow down (to all involved stakeholders) and sincerely 
apologize. 
이번 사고로 고귀한 생명을 잃은 고인의 명복을 빌며 유가족 분들에게 엎드려 
사죄 드립니다. / We sincerely pray for the repose of the deceased and apologize to the 
bereaved. 
 
특히 대학 생활을 앞둔 젊은이들이 꿈을 피우기도 전에 유명을 달리하게 된 데에 
무거운 책임을 느끼며, 소중한 분들을 잃게 되어 비통함에 빠진 모든 분들께 
깊은 사죄의 말씀을 올립니다. / We feel heavily responsible for the loss of young lives, 
who were to start their college life. Our deepest sympathy and apology to those who are filled 
with deep sadness 
부상을 입은 분들과 그 가족 분들께도 애통한 심정으로 사죄 드립니다. 하루 
빨리 회복하시고 쾌유하시도록 저희 코오롱은 모든 지원을 아끼지 않겠습니다. 
We also sincerely apologize to those who were injured from the incident, and to their family 
members. We wish them to recover fast, and we would not hesitate to support them with all 
possible means.  
 
이번 사고로 국민 여러분께 심려를 끼치게 된 점에 대해서도 책임을 통감합니다. 
코오롱은 현재 사고대책본부를 설치해 신속한 사고 수습을 위해 만전을 기하고 
있으며, 무엇보다 인명구조에 최선의 노력을 다 하겠습니다. 또한 사고 원인 
규명에 한 점의 부족함이 없도록 최선을 다 하겠습니다. / We feel our responsibility 
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keenly regarding the case, as it gave the public occasion to feel anxiety. Kolon has 
established an emergency headquarters to deal with the incident, and we will do our best to 
save life. We will also show our best effort to investigate on the cause of the incident. 
 
다시 한 번 고인과 유가족, 부상을 입으신 분들을 비롯한 모든 분들께 사죄를 
드립니다. / Once again, we sincerely apologize to deceased, bereaved and to all other 
relevant individuals. 
 
-코오롱그룹 이웅열 회장 및 임직원 일동 / Chairman Lee, Woong-yeol and all 
executive staffs 
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Appendix 5: Partial collection of relevant Korean Aviation Safety and Security Act81 
associated with this case, which particularly works against Cho Hyun-ah’s legitimacy 
defense. 
항공보안법 / AVIATION SAFETY AND SECURITY ACT 
[시행 2014.4.6.] [법률 제 12257 호, 2014.1.14., 일부개정] / [Enforcement Date 06. Apr, 
2014.] [Act No.12257, 14. Jan, 2014., Partial Amendment] 
제 2 조(정의) / Article 2 (Definitions) 
이 법에서 사용하는 용어의 뜻은 다음과 같다. 다만, 이 법에 특별한 규정이 있는 
것을 제외하고는 「항공법」에서 정하는 바에 따른다. /The terms used in this Act shall 
be defined as follows: Provided, That those not specially prescribed in this Act shall be as 
prescribed by the Aviation Act:  <Amended by Act No. 11244, Jan. 26, 2012; Act No. 
11753, Apr. 5, 2013> 
1. "운항중"이란 승객이 탑승한 후 항공기의 모든 문이 닫힌 때부터 내리기 
위하여 문을 열 때까지를 말한다 / 1. The term "in flight" means from the time all the 
doors of an airplane close after passengers aboard the airplane until the time all the doors of 
the airplane open for passengers to disembark;). 
제 23 조(승객의 협조의무) / Article 23 (Obligations of Passengers to Cooperate) 
① 항공기 내에 있는 승객은 항공기와 승객의 안전한 운항과 여행을 위하여 다음 
각 호의 어느 하나에 해당하는 행위를 하여서는 아니 된다.  <개정 2013.7.16.> / 
                                               
81 Adopted from national law information center;  
Korean: http://www.law.go.kr/lsInfoP.do?lsiSeq=150098#0000  
English translation: 
http://www.law.go.kr/eng/engLsSc.do?menuId=1&query=aviation&x=0&y=0#liBgcolor19  
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(1) No passenger on board shall engage in any of the following acts to ensure the safe flight 
of an airplane and travel of passengers:  <Amended by Act No. 11932, Jul. 16, 2013> 
1. 폭언, 고성방가 등 소란행위 / 1. Making a noise, such as abusive language, loud 
singing; 
2. 흡연(흡연구역에서의 흡연은 제외한다) / 2. Smoking (excluding smoking in a 
smoking zone); 
3. 술을 마시거나 약물을 복용하고 다른 사람에게 위해를 주는 행위 / 3. Doing 
harm to other persons after drinking alcohol or taking drug; 
4. 다른 사람에게 성적(性的) 수치심을 일으키는 행위 / 4. Causing sexual humiliation 
to others; 
5. 「항공법」 제 61 조의 2 를 위반하여 전자기기를 사용하는 행위 / 5. Using 
electronic equipment, in violation of Article 61-2 of the Aviation Act; 
6. 기장의 승낙 없이 조종실 출입을 기도하는 행위 / 6. Attempting to enter the 
cockpit without the captain's consent; 
7. 기장등의 업무를 위계 또는 위력으로써 방해하는 행위 / 7. Obstructing the duties 
of the captain, etc. by a deceptive plan or power. 
② 승객은 항공기의 보안이나 운항을 저해하는 
폭행ㆍ협박ㆍ위계행위(危計行爲)를 하거나 출입문ㆍ탈출구ㆍ기기의 조작을 
하여서는 아니 된다.  <개정 2013.4.5.> / (2) No passenger shall attack, threaten, engage 
in deception or handle the entrance, emergency exit and devices, which hinder the security 
and flight of the airplane.  <Amended by Act No. 11753, Apr. 5, 2013> 
③ 승객은 항공기가 착륙한 후 항공기에서 내리지 아니하고 항공기를 점거하거나 
항공기 내에서 농성하여서는 아니 된다. / (3) No passenger shall occupy the airplane 
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and stage a sit-down demonstration on the airplane without disembarking the airplane after 
the airplane lands.  
제 42 조(항공기 항로 변경죄) / Article 42 (Crime of Altering Course of Airplane) 
위계 또는 위력으로써 운항중인 항공기의 항로를 변경하게 하여 정상 운항을 
방해한 사람은 1 년 이상 10 년 이하의 징역에 처한다. [전문개정 2010.3.22.] / Any 
person who impedes the normal flight of an airplane by forcing the airplane in flight to alter 
course by a deceptive plan or power shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one 
year but not more than ten years. [This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10160, Mar. 22, 
2010] 
제 43 조(직무집행방해죄) / Article 43 (Crime of Interference in Execution of Duties) 
폭행ㆍ협박 또는 위계로써 기장등의 정당한 직무집행을 방해하여 항공기와 
승객의 안전을 해친 사람은 10 년 이하의 징역에 처한다. [전문개정 2010.3.22.] / 
Any person who harms the safety of an airplane and its passengers by interference in the 
legitimate execution of duties of the captain, etc. by violence, intimidation or a deceptive plan 
shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than ten years. [This Article Wholly 
Amended by Act No. 10160, Mar. 22, 2010]제 46 조(항공기 안전운항 저해 폭행죄 등) / 
Article 46 (Crime of Violence, etc. Impeding Safe Flight of Aircraft) 
제 23 조제 2 항을 위반한 사람은 5 년 이하의 징역에 처한다. [전문개정 2010.3.22.] 
/ Any person who violates Article 23 (2) shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than 
five years. [This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10160, Mar. 22, 2010] 
제 50 조(벌칙) / Article 50 (Penalty Provisions) 
② 다음 각 호의 어느 하나에 해당하는 자는 500 만원 이하의 벌금에 처한다.  
<개정 2013.4.5., 2013.7.16.> / (2) Any of the following persons shall be punished by a fine 
not exceeding five million won:  <Amended by Act No. 11753, Apr. 5, 2013; Act No. 11932, 
Jul. 16, 2013> 
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3. 기장등의 사전 경고에도 불구하고 운항 중인 항공기 내에서 
제 23 조제 1 항제 1 호부터 제 5 호까지 및 제 7 호에 따른 위반행위를 한 사람 / 3. 
A person who commits an offense under Article 23 (1) 1 through 5 and 7 on the airplane in 
flight despite a prior warning of the captain, etc.; 
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Appendix 6: Partial Collection of relevant Korean Aviation Act82 
항공법 / AVIATION ACT 
[시행 2016.9.30.] [법률 제 14114 호, 2016.3.29., 일부개정] / [Enforcement Date 16. Jan, 
2015.] [Act No.12817, 15. Oct, 2014., Partial Amendment] 
제 50 조(기장의 권한 등) / Article 50 (Authority, etc. of Plane Captain) 
① 항공기의 비행 안전에 대하여 책임을 지는 사람(이하 "기장"이라 한다)은 그 
항공기의 승무원을 지휘ㆍ감독한다. / (1) Each person responsible for the flight safety of 
an aircraft (hereinafter referred to as "plane captain") shall direct and supervise the crew of 
the aircraft. 
② 기장은 국토교통부령으로 정하는 바에 따라 항공기의 운항에 필요한 준비가 
끝난 것을 확인한 후가 아니면 항공기를 출발시켜서는 아니 된다.  <개정 
2013.3.23.> / (2) No plane captain shall take off without confirming whether the aircraft is 
completely prepared for operation, as prescribed by Ordinance of the Ministry of Land, 
Infrastructure and Transport.  <Amended by Act No. 11690, Mar. 23, 2013> 
③ 기장은 항공기나 여객에 위난(危難)이 발생하였거나 발생할 우려가 있다고 
인정될 때에는 항공기에 있는 여객에게 피난방법과 그 밖에 안전에 관하여 
필요한 사항을 명할 수 있다. / (3) If an aircraft or any of its passengers encounter or are 
anticipated to encounter danger, the plane captain may order passengers on board the aircraft 
to evacuate from the aircraft as directed or take other necessary safety measures. 
                                               
82 Korean: 
http://www.law.go.kr/lsSc.do?menuId=0&p1=&subMenu=1&nwYn=1&section=&tabNo=&query=%ED%95%
AD%EA%B3%B5%EB%B2%95#undefined 
English translation: 
http://www.law.go.kr/eng/engLsSc.do?menuId=1&query=aviation+chief&x=0&y=0#liBgcolor0  
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④ 기장은 항행 중 그 항공기에 위난이 발생하였을 때에는 여객을 구조하고, 
지상 또는 수상(水上)에 있는 사람이나 물건에 대한 위난 방지에 필요한 수단을 
마련하여야 하며, 여객과 그 밖에 항공기에 있는 사람을 그 항공기에서 나가게 
한 후가 아니면 항공기를 떠나서는 아니 된다. / (4) If an aircraft encounters danger 
during flight, the plane captain shall take measures necessary to rescue passengers and 
prevent danger to persons or things on land or water, and shall not leave the aircraft unless 
he/she has taken measures to ensure the passengers and other persons on board have left the 
aircraft. 
⑤ 기장은 항공기사고, 항공기준사고 또는 항공안전장애가 발생하였을 때에는 
국토교통부령으로 정하는 바에 따라 국토교통부장관에게 그 사실을 보고하여야 
한다. 다만, 기장이 보고할 수 없는 경우에는 그 항공기의 소유자등이 보고를 
하여야 한다.  <개정 2013.3.23.> / (5) If an aircraft accident, aircraft incident, or aviation 
safety hindrance occurs, the plane captain shall report it to the Minister of Land, 
Infrastructure and Transport, as prescribed by Ordinance of the Ministry of Land, 
Infrastructure and Transport: Provided, That if the plane captain is unable to make the report, 
the owner, etc. of the aircraft shall report it.  <Amended by Act No. 11690, Mar. 23, 2013> 
⑥ 기장은 다른 항공기에서 항공기사고, 항공기준사고 또는 항공안전장애가 
발생한 것을 알았을 때에는 국토교통부령으로 정하는 바에 따라 
국토교통부장관에게 그 사실을 보고하여야 한다. 다만, 무선설비를 통하여 그 
사실을 안 경우에는 그러하지 아니하다.  <개정 2013.3.23.> / (6) If a plane captain 
discovers that another aircraft has had an aircraft accident, aircraft incident or aviation safety 
hindrance, he/she shall report it to the Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, as 
prescribed by Ordinance of the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport: Provided, 
That this shall not apply where the fact is found through wireless apparatus.  <Amended by 
Act No. 11690, Mar. 23, 2013> 
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[전문개정 2009.6.9.] / [This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 9780, Jun. 9, 2009] 
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Appendix 7: Partial collection of relevant Criminal Act 
형법 / CRIMINAL ACT83 
제 34 장 신용, 업무와 경매에 관한 죄 / CHAPTER XXXIV CRIMES AGAINST 
CREDIT, BUSINESS AND AUCTION 
제 314 조(업무방해) / Article 314 (Interference with Business)  
① 제 313 조의 방법 또는 위력으로써 사람의 업무를 방해한 자는 5 년 이하의 
징역 또는 1 천 500 만원 이하의 벌금에 처한다.  <개정 1995.12.29.> / (1) A person 
who interferes with the business of another by the method of Article 313 or by the threat of 
force, shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than five years or by a fine not 
exceeding fifteen million won. <Amended by Act No. 5057, Dec. 29, 1995> 
② 컴퓨터등 정보처리장치 또는 전자기록등 특수매체기록을 손괴하거나 
정보처리장치에 허위의 정보 또는 부정한 명령을 입력하거나 기타 방법으로 
정보처리에 장애를 발생하게 하여 사람의 업무를 방해한 자도 제 1 항의 형과 
같다.  <신설 1995.12.29.> / (2) Any person who interferes with another person's business 
by damaging or destroying any data processor, such as computer, or special media records, 
such as electromagnetic records, or inputting false information or improper order into the data 
processor, or making any impediment in processing any data by other way, shall also be 
subject to the same punishment as referred to in paragraph (1). <Newly Inserted by Act No. 
5057, Dec. 29, 1995> 
                                               
83 Korean: 
http://www.law.go.kr/lsInfoP.do?lsiSeq=183536&ancYd=20160529&efYd=20160529&ancNo=14178#AJAX 
English translation: 
http://www.law.go.kr/eng/engLsSc.do?menuId=1&query=criminal+act&x=0&y=0#liBgcolor30 
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제 37 장 권리행사를 방해하는 죄 / CHAPTER XXXVII CRIMES OF OBSTRUCTING 
ANOTHER FROM EXERCISING HIS RIGHT 
제 324 조(강요) / Article 324 (Coercion)  
폭행 또는 협박으로 사람의 권리행사를 방해하거나 의무없는 일을 하게 한 자는 
5 년 이하의 징역 또는 3 천만원 이하의 벌금에 처한다.  <개정 1995.12.29., 
2016.1.6.> / A person who obstructs another from exercising his right by violence or 
intimidation, or coerces one to do any unobliged work, shall be punished by imprisonment for 
not more than five years. <Amended by Act No. 5057, Dec. 29, 1995> 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
